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ARTICLE

STANDING DOCTRINE, JUDICIAL
TECHNIQUE, AND THE GRADUAL
SHIFT FROM RIGHTS-BASED
CONSTITUTIONALISM TO
EXECUTIVE-CENTERED
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Laura A. Cisnerost
ABSTRACT
Although scholars have long criticized the standing doctrine
for its malleability, its incoherence, and its inconsistent
application, few have considered whether this chaos is
related to the Court's insistence that standing be used as a
tool to maintain separation of powers.' Most articles on
Copyright 0 2008 by Laura A. Cisneros.
tAssistant Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law; LL.M., University of
Wisconsin Law School; J.D., Loyola University New Orleans School of Law; B.A., University
of San Diego. I would like to thank Arthur McEvoy and Victoria Nourse for their feedback on
earlier drafts of this Article. I am also grateful to the William H. Hastie Fellowship Program at
the University of Wisconsin for its support of my research. Finally, I am grateful to the
organizers and participants in the Scholarly Papers panel at the 2009 Association of American
Law Schools' Annual Conference for the opportunity to present and discuss this project. My
thanks, as well, to the editors at the Case Western Reserve Law Review for their extremely
conscientious work.
I Scholarship focusing specifically on the Court's separation of powers rationale is
comparatively sparse. The first significant article on this topic was published in 1983 in the
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standing, at least those written in the last thirty years, do not
question whether standing should be freighted with
separation of powers principles, but whether the standing
doctrine, as applied in a given case, is consistent with those
principles.2 These treatments, which largely accept that the
constitutional aspect of standing derives from separation of
powers, are unsatisfying because they do not effectively
consider the more fundamental query-i.e., why has a
political concept (separation of powers) been attached to a
legal framework (standing)? Nothing in the general
conception of separation of powers would seem to require the
intricate standing rules the Court has developed.
This Article addresses why the Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Warren Burger began to deploy separationof powers
language when evaluating whether a particularplaintiff had
standing to sue the federal government, and why this trend
continued through William Rehnquist's tenure as Chief
Justice and affects the Roberts Court today. My analysis
indicates that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts radically
changed the standing inquiry by fireighting it with political
concepts, and in so doing were able to weaken the rightsbased constitutionalism that had marked the Warren Court
era. This, in turn, made more room for executive branch
policy-making and action. I conclude that the standing

Suffolk University Law Review, by then-Judge Antonin Scalia: Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SuFFoLK U. L. REV. 881
(1983) (concluding that separation of powers principles are vital to the standing inquiry because
they limit the types of cases courts may hear in general, and would prevent the court from
hearing widespread injury cases and cases where the judiciary would clash with the political
branches in particular). But see Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v.
Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 641 (1985) [hereinafter Nichol, Abusing Standing] (arguing that
the Allen Court's decision to infuse the standing doctrine with yet another value-laden criterion,
i.e., separation of powers principles, stretched the doctrine beyond its limits); Robert J. Pushaw,
Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-FederalistApproach, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
393, 397-99 (1996) (arguing that the Court's misguided conception of separation of powers has
created an incoherent standing doctrine, which could be corrected by understanding and
applying the Federalist ideas of justiciability and separated government, namely accepting that
the dual nature of separation of powers included both the efficiency theory of government and
the checking and balancing theory).
2 See, e.g., Heather Elliot, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REv. 459 (2008)
(defining three separation of powers functions of the standing doctrine and discussing the
doctnine's failings in each); Dana S. Treister, Note, Standing to Sue the Government Are
Separation of Powers Principles Really Being Served?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 689, 691 (1994)
(suggesting that comingling of powers within the three branches of government is necessary to
ensure proper government function).
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decisions of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, by merging the
legal discourse of standing to sue with the political discourse
of separation of powers, laid the foundationfor the Roberts
Court to initiate a move away from a rights-based
jurisprudence to a jurisprudence that provides constitutional
spacefor a unitary executive.
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INTRODUCTION
The Roberts Court is the heir to more than three decades of
tortured constitutional discourse on the nature and function of the
standing doctrine. It has also inherited an intense debate concerning
the viability and scope of the unitary executive theory. The purpose of
this Article is to determine whether there is a connection between the
two and, assuming a discernable one exists, to assess how that
connection developed and what it means for the constitutional balance
of power among the three branches of government.
Treating standing to sue simply as a legal doctrine, justified by the
authority of precedent, does little to advance our understanding of
how standing's confused jurisprudence fits within the overall
constitutional order. 3 As I will demonstrate, the standing doctrine has
evolved over the last thirty-plus years to include distinct, though
perhaps not obvious, political components that reflect the
3 Here I rely on an affiliation with the definition used by Mark Tushnet, who defines
.'constitutional order" or "regime" as "a reasonably stable set of institutions through which a
nation's fundamental decisions are made over a sustained period, and the principles that guide
those decisions." MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTIUTIONAL ORDER 1 (2003).
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conservative political thought of the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts
Courts. Still, focusing solely on the ideology of individual Justices to
explain what drives the Court's decision-making in standing cases
leaves the analysis incomplete. The debate between judicial activism
and judicial restraint has gone on so long that it has hardened into a
kind of rhetorical stasis with little heuristic value. Likewise, it has
become doctrinaire to depict the Warren Court as excessively liberal
and activist and the Burger and Rehnquist Courts as conservative and
restrained. Again, however, these characterizations, while not
necessarily false, simply do not go far enough. They do not describe
these changes in a dynamic legal or political context; they do not
articulate how or why this important shift occurred.
This thesis moves beyond conventional partisan line-drawing
(though not politics per se) to explain the role standing has played in
redefining the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence when
faced with suits challenging the executive branch. I argue that the
Burger Court, as well as the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts that
followed, inherited from the Warren Court a set of institutional
arrangements that could not be dismantled overtly (if at all), and,
therefore, each was forced to chip away at Chief Justice Earl
Warren's rights-based constitutionalism by more subtle meansnamely, by altering the procedural rules by which rights-based cases
against the federal government could be brought. Specifically, I assert
that the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have inserted
separation of powers concerns, which form a distinctly political
discourse, into the standing doctrine, which is a legal discourse.4 By
conflating these two autonomous, largely unrelated analyses, the
Court has given itself a means to move away from the rights-based
constitutionalism of the Warren era to a nascent executive-centered
constitutionalism that creates the space necessary to legitimize (and
protect) the unitary executive. 5
4Discourses are about what can be said and thought, but also about who can speak,
when, and with what authority. The issue in discourse analysis is why, at a given time, out of all
the possible things that could be said, only certain things were said. French philosopher Michel
Foucault framed the inquiry this way: "[Hiow is it that one particular statement appeared rather
than another?" MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 27 (A.M. Sheridan
Smith trans., Tavistock 1974). Discourses embody meaning and relationships, social, political,
and legal. They constitute both subjectivity and power relations. Id. at 49 (explaining that
discourses are "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak"). Thus, the
possibilities for meaning and for definition are pre-empted through the social and institutional
position held by those who use them. What this Article suggests is that the Burger Court
launched an attack on the Warren Court's egalitarian jurisprudence by using this idea of
statement inclusion and exclusion in the Court's discussions about procedure.
5For a discussion of the institutional and theoretical literature on executive
constitutionalism, see Comnelia T.L. Pillard, The Unflfilled Promise of the Constitution in
Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. Ray. 676, 683 (2005) (defining executive constitutionalism as
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This Article traces the nearly four-decade history of the modem
standing doctrine to reveal its role in moving American constitutional
jurisprudence away from a distinctively court-centered "rights"
orientation to an orientation that is executive-branch-centered. For
this reason, the Article's narrative begins with the Warren Court and
concludes with the Roberts Court.
Part I briefly describes the Warren Court's largely successful effort
to articulate a court-centered "rights-based" constitutionalism and
embed that constitutionalism firmly in American political and legal
discourse, fundamentally altering the institutional arrangements it (the
Warren Court) would leave to its successors. Part HI explains how and
why the Burger Court modified the standing doctrine to
reformulate the constitutional norms handed down to it by the Warren
Court, all the while touting judicial restraint and appearing to leave
much of the Warren era jurisprudence unmolested. Part 1HI carries the
analysis into the Rehnquist Court, where the standing doctrine, now
infused with separation of powers principles, became a tool for
creating constitutional space for the President-and the executive
branch as a whole-to operate more freely without congressional or
judicial oversight. In this section, I examine the text of a number of
key Rehnquist Court decisions to demonstrate how political ideas
make their way into federal judicial consciousness and then into the
Court's actual written opinions, though in the latter case, they are
often disguised in legal garb. Finally, Part IV examines the Roberts
Court's struggle with the modem standing doctrine in light of the
tendency of President George W. Bush's administration to adopt an
aggressive form of "unitary executive" decision-making, placing the
Court squarely within the ongoing debate between the Presidentialist
and Pluralist interpretations of separation of powers.6 This debate
suggests that the Roberts Court is at a cross-roads with respect to
which camp will receive the imprimatur of the Supreme Court. I

non-court centered constitutional interpretation whereby the executive plays "a significant
generative role in elaborating a distinctive executive vision of constitutional obligation that
could supplement," or "supplant, the Court's").
6 Proponents of the Presidentialist view argue that the Constitution vests a fixed and
expansive category of executive authority in the President that is largely immune from
congressional oversight or judicial review. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, When Inter-B ranch Norms
Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, "Orderly Shutdowns," Presidential Impeachments, and
Judicial "Coups," 12 CoRNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 503, 534 (2003). In contrast, the Pluralist
view holds that checks and balances are an essential element of separation of powers. Its
proponents dispute the notion of fixed executive power and in fact sec separation of powers
interpretations as necessarily calling for persistent monitoring by each branch of the other. See,
e.g., Peter M. Shane, PoliticalAccountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of
PresidentialReview of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 195 (1995).
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argue that the Roberts Court has already begun to show favor, and is
using the standing doctrine to make its preference felt, as illustrated
by its 2007 decision in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,
7
Inc.
I conclude that the standing decision in Hein, at least on the
domestic front, poses a significant threat to the checks and balances
system of separated government because it gives primacy to the
executive's constitutional interpretation of the Establishment Clause,
thus protecting the executive branch from judicial review. Although

the Bush administration has failed in its aggressive atteMpts8 to
expand the scope of the unitary executive in the foreign policy
context, Hein represents a major victory for the Presidentialists in the
West Wing and the Department of Justice. Hein is more than the
innocuous "procedural" case it appears to be; it marks an early and
important step toward executive-centered constitutionalism.

1. THE WARREN COURT ADVANCED

AND ENTRENCHED
BASED CONSTITUTIONALISM

RIGHTS-

To a significant degree, the Warren Court successfully articulated
a rights-based constitutionalism that it embedded firmly in American
political and legal discourse. In so doing, it fundamentally altered the
institutional arrangement it would leave to its successors. As Lucas
Powe, law professor and leading historian of the Supreme Court,
points out in The Warren Court and American Politics, "[tlhe Warren
Court created the image of the Supreme Court as a revolutionary
body, a powerful force for social change." 9 As a result, later Courts
would be evaluated in terms of their acceptance or rejection of the
idea that the Supreme Court, as an institution, is an instrument of
social change-the very idea that defined the Warren Court.
This aspect of the Warren Court legacy presented opportunities
and challenges to subsequent Courts that opposed the pro-New
Deal/Great Society ideology and the judicial activism that
7127 S.Ct. 2553 (2007) (holding that federal taxpayers did not have standing under
Article 111of the Constitution to challenge the Executive Office's Faith-Based Community
Initiatives Program as violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because the
exception to the bar on federal taxpayer standing oniy applied to specific Acts or appropriations
of Congress).
8See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 482-83 (2004) (holding that the habeas corpus
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, entitled the detainees to challenge the validity of their detention at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in the U.S. federal court system); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 593-94 (2006) (holding that military commissions set up by the Bush administration to try
detainees at Guantanamo Bay lacked authority because they lacked congressional authorization
and did not comply with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Convention).
9LUCAS A. POWF, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (2000).
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characterized the Warren Court. It is important to understand,
however, that the Warren Court's rights-based constitutionalism was
not limited to substantive law, but was coupled with procedural
safeguards that would give litigants access to the new rights and make
them meaningful. Indeed, there would be no benefit to having the
constitutional protections of individual liberty and minority rights if
litigants could not invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
challenge actions of the federal government. The standing doctrine
the Warren Court inherited actually facilitated the emergent
transformation of America into a "democracy of rights." Ultimately, it
allowed the Warren Court to redefine the judiciary in American legal
consciousness as the protector of individual liberties and
egalitarian principles.
A. The Supreme Court Develops a Rights-Based Jurisprudence
1. Rejecting JudicialRestraint to FacilitateProtection of Individual
Rights
During the 1960s, the Warren Court rejected Justice Felix
Frankfurter's concept of the politically restrained judiciary and
retrained the Court's role as one of advancing and protecting "a
democracy of rights."' 0 A leading exponent of judicial restraint,
Justice Frankfurter believed that "the core principle of American
constitutional democracy was majoritarianism and the chief danger
was judicial tyranny." t" In Justice Frankfurter's view, the judicial
branch, especially the Supreme Court, was not to legislate or make
policy, regardless of whether a particular case stimulated the political
sympathies of the individual Justices.'12 Nevertheless, Chief Justice

10Leading American constitutional theorist, Stephen M. Griffin notes, "'The United States
has not always been a democracy of ights." Stephen M. Griffin, Judicial Supremacy and Equal
Protection in a Democracy of Rights, 4 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 281, 282 (2002). Griffin attributes
the transformation of America into a democracy of rights to the Civil Rights Movement. Id. He
writes that the concept of "democracy of ights" describes a political system where all
"government actors take it for granted that it is desirable to create, enforce, and promote
individual constitutional and legal ights. Hence, the political branches of government (not just
the courts) are seeking constantly to maintain and extend the system of rights they have created
through democratic means." Id. As I use the phrase here, I mean to refer both to the political
system created when the judicial and political branches partner to create and protect individual
rights, and the Court's actual rights-based jurisprudence.
1THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT INHISTORY: THE ROAD TO
MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 41 (2004).
12For discussions of Justice Felix Frankfurter as judicial restraint's strongest advocate and
his constant promotion of the importance of judicial deference to legislative judgments, see
generally PHILIP B. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (197 1);
MELVIN 1. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
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Warren and those Justices who made up the majority of the Court
believed that the Court had the capacity to act as the engine of reform
where the political processes failed to protect individuals and groups
that had historically been underserved (if not outright persecuted) by
the local, state, and federal governments. 13 Whereas Justice
Frankfurter admonished his fellow Justices to avoid reaching
constitutional questions whenever possible, even at the expense of
logic, the Warren Court did not evade constitutional issues in the
cases before it. For the Warren Court, the legal opinions it published
were the most effective means of imprinting the new "democracy of
rights" on the American legal and political consciousness.
2. Court as "Active " Protectorof Individual Rights Against the
Government
The source of the
service of individual
conventional view,
Blum, 14 holds that
derived from Justice

Warren Court's theory of judicial activism in the
rights is the subject of considerable debate. The
at least according to historian John Morton
the Warren Court's rights jurisprudence was
Harlan Stone's famous Footnote Four in United

States v. Carolene Products

Co.'15

There, Justice Stone articulates

when heightened judicial scrutiny is required to safeguard the public
from the government. 16 According to Footnote Four, there are three
situations where such judicial activity is warranted: (1) when
enforcing specific constitutional limitations on government power,
specifically those limitations contained in the Bill of Rights; (2) when
protecting the channels of democratic government, i.e., safeguarding
fairness in the electoral process; and (3) when protecting "discrete
1
and insular" minorities from political or societal discrimination. 7
Justice Stone recognized that a new constitutional foundation was
required to justify the Court's heightened protection of individual and
minority rights against encroachment from an increasingly pervasive
modern state; but it was the Warren Court that established this

32(1991).
13 See, e.g., MORTON J. HoRwnTz, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE
(1998) (outlining the "liberal" changes the Warren Court created in America's civil liberties
jurisprudence); TH-E WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE (Mark
Tushnet ed., 1993) [hereinafter WARREN COURT PERSPECTIVE] (examining the Warren Court as
an actor in 1960s politics).
"4 JOHN MORTON BLUM, YEARS OF DISCORD: AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 19611974. at 188-90 (199 1).
15304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding a congressional regulation of filled milk).
16 Id. at 153 n.4.
17 Id.
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foundation and permnanently fixed it within the public's perception of
the Supreme Court.' 8 For the Warren Court, Footnote Four justified
an expanded notion of judicial review allowing the Court to address
unequal or discriminatory social conditions and to reform the very
structure of public institutions.' 9 So convincing was the Warren Court
in this effort that, even today, many Americans view this to be the
Court's primary role in the governmental system.2 0
3. The Warren Court's Rights-Based Jurisprudence:A Compliment to
Presidentialand CongressionalEfforts to Rein in "Retrograde"
States in the South and Northeast
It is important to recognize that the Warren Court's heightened
scrutiny of political processes was predominantly aimed at state
governments, which had been slow to embrace their responsibilities
under the Fourteenth Amendment. As Powe has noted, the federal
government, first under President John F. Kennedy, then under
President Lyndon B. Johnson, was committed to defending the rights
of "those most in need of help.",2 ' During the Warren era, "those most
in need of help" were individuals and minority groups who received
inadequate protection (and occasionally unwarranted interference)
from selected states. For example, the Court intervened to eradicate
offensive southern practices regarding racial inequality, the rights of
criminal defendants, and religious freedom, as well as to eliminate the
stringent regulations of contraception in the Catholic Northeast. 22
Rather than conflicting with the contemporary political climate, the
18

HARv.

See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93

L. REv. 1, 6 (1979) (defining Footnote Four as "[tjhe great and modem charter for
ordering the relation between judges and other agencies of government" and discussing the
Warren Court's implementation of Footnote Four to usher in structural reform litigation).
'9 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (banning segregation of public
schools); see also United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969)
(faculty desegregation); Bradley v. Sch. Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965) (per curiam) (same).
20 See WARREN COURT PERSPECTIVE, supra note 13, at I ('The Warren Court's definition
of the Supreme Court's role in government remains prominent in contemporary political
discussion. .. )
21 See POwE, supra note 9, at 489.
22 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that law enforcement must
inform criminal suspects in custody of their right to consult with an attorney and of their right
against self-incrimination prior to interrogation); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (striking down a state law that prohibited the use and distribution of contraceptives);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (formulating the "one-man, one-vote" standard for state
legislative redistricting, dramatically altering the relative power of rural regions in many states);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying the "one-man, one-vote" standard to
congressional districts); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring law enforcement
to give all felons-including the indigent-Sixth Amendment right to legal counsel); Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) (declaring that "[t]he freedom to hold religious beliefs and
opinions is absolute"); Brown, 347 U.S. 483.

1100

1100

WESTERN
~CASE RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[o.5: 59:4
[Vol.

rights-protecting landmark decisions of the Warren Court
complimented the efforts of the legislative and executive branches,
both of which were actively trying to impose a national set of civil
rights.2 Thus, although the Warren Court assumed an activist posture
against the states, it did so as part of a coordinated effort with the
political branches of the federal government to enforce national
values against infringement by local outliers.2
This is an important point of contrast with the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts that followed. Whereas the Warren Court
addressed alleged constitutional transgressions by state and local
governments, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts were more often
presented with cases that challenged actions of the federal
government, thus implicating the Constitution's tri-partite power
structure. Such cases raise a host of jurisdictional questions,
including: When does an individual have the right to sue the President
or the administrative agencies he controls? And, assuming that right
exists, should the Court enforce it?
This is not to say that the Warren Court never confronted these
issues. It did, as we shall see below. However, the Court's desire to
build a new rights-based jurisprudence overwhelmed any "provincial"
concerns of the executive branch over separation of powers. On the
contrary, the Warren Court took aggressive steps to increase public
access to the federal court system, especially where plaintiffs had
charged government actors-be they of the local, state, or federal
variety-with violations of the law. For this reason, the Warren Court
did all that it could to keep the standing bar low. 25
B. Facilitatinga Rights-Based Constitutionalismand the Protective
Judicial Role Through Footnote Four and Standing to Sue
The two definitive standing decisions of the Warren Court were
Baker v. Carr6 and Flast v. Cohen. 7 In Baker, the Court granted
standing to voters to bring an Equal Protection Clause challenge to a
23 See POwE, supra note 9; Martin Shapiro,
Fathers and Sons: The Court, the
Commentators, and the Search for Values, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 218 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
24 Some of the Warren Court's contemporary supporters defended it on precisely these
grounds. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN

INSTRUMENT OF REFORM (1968).
25 See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 48

(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992) (juxtaposing the relaxed standing tendencies of the Warren
Court with the restrictive tendencies of the Burger Court to illustrate the significance of the
Warren Court's contribution to the standing doctrine).
26 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
27 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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state redistricting statute. 28 In Flast, the Court granted standing to
federal taxpayers to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to a
congressional act that appropriated funds to parochial schools.2
These decisions illustrate that the standing doctrine did not present an
obstacle to the Warren Court's protection of individuals and minority
groups against government infringement; the Court simply construed
standing to sue as a prudential doctrine meant to ensure that federal
courts resolved only those issues presented in a clear, adversarial
context. For the Warren Court, the standing inquiry implicated no
separation of powers concerns.
1. Baker v. Carr
Baker v. Carr represents a classic Footnote Four case. The Warren
Court's interpretation of the standing doctrine in Baker allowed the
Court to reach Tennessee's re-apportionment policies, which operated
to reduce the political power of urban centers where AfricanAmericans made up the majority of the electorate. In Baker, a group
of voters in Tennessee challenged a state redistricting statute on
grounds that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment . 30 Despite state law, which required Tennessee to
redraw legislative districts every ten years according to the federal
census to provide for districts of substantially equal population,

Tennessee had not redistricted since the census of

1901.3 1 By

the time

of Baker's lawsuit, the population in his district, which included most
of the City of Memphis, had nearly ten times as many residents as
some of the rural districts. The state's failure to redistrict meant that
the votes of rural citizens were worth more than those of urban
citizens. This functionally diluted the black-majority district's votes.
The Court granted the plaintiffs standing, holding that "the gist of
the question of standing" is whether the party seeking relief has
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions."3 The voter's injury, the Court
stated, was that the statute affected a "gross disproportion of
representation to [a] voting population" placing the voters "in a
position of constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-ii-vis voters in
28

Baker, 369 U.S. at 204-08.

"9 Ff088, 392 U.S. at 85-8 8.
30

Baker, 369 U.S. at 188.
at 190.
at 204.

31 Id.
32 Id.

1102

1102

WESTERN
~CASERESERVE LAW REVWEW

[Vol.
59:4
[o.5:

irrationally favored counties."3 In granting standing, the Court
concluded that the injury the voters sought to remedy and protect was
sufficiently personal.3
The Baker decision's jurisdictional analysis indicates that the
Court viewed the standing doctrine as a device to ensure that
plaintiffs bring only concrete adversarial issues to the Court for
adjudication . 35 In the midst of the civil rights era-after the
Montgomery Bus Boycott and during the Freedom Rides-the
Warren Court's decision to grant standing in Baker allowed the Court
to dramatically alter the nature of political representation in those
regions of the United States still yoked to de facto racial segregation.
2. Flast v. Cohen
Six years after Baker, in 1968, Flast v. Cohen presented the Court
with another opportunity to apply its Footnote Four philosophy. This
time, however, the plaintiffs asked the Court to enforce the
protections of the First Amendment against the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare. In Flast, federal taxpayers complained that
certain expenditures of federal funds under the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 violated the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.3 The taxpayers alleged that federal funds
appropriated under the Act were being used to finance instruction in
reading, arithmetic, and other subjects, and to purchase textbooks and
other instructional materials in religious schools.3 The government
brought a standing challenge to the taxpayers' suit and moved for
dismissal.3 The government argued that the plaintiffs lacked
standing due to Article Ifl limitations on federal court jurisdiction and
separation of powers considerations.3
The Court disagreed. Relying on the Baker decision's articulation
of the standing function, the Court in Flast declared, 'iltihe
fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking
to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he
wishes to have adjudicated."4 0 More importantly, the Court rejected
the government's separation of powers argument, finding that:
33
34

Id. at 207-08.
Id. at 207 (finding the injury that

own").

Id. at 199.
Flast,392 U.S. at 85.
Id. at 85-86.
38 Id. at 88.
31 Id. at 92.
40 Id. at 99.
35
36
31

voters sought to remedy was "an interest of their
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When the emphasis in the standing problem is placed on
whether the person invoking a federal court's jurisdiction is a
proper party to maintain the action, the weakness of the
Government's argument in this case becomes apparent. The
question whether a particularperson is a proper party to
maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise
separation of powers problems related to improper judicial
interference in areas committed to other branches of the
Federal Government. Such problems arise, if at all, only from
the substantive issues the individual seeks to have
adjudicated. Thus, in terms of Article Ell limitations on
federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related
only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of judicial resolution. It is for that reason
that the emphasis in standing problems is on whether the
party invoking federal court jurisdiction has "a personal stake

in the outcome of the controversy ....

*41

The Court held that the taxpayers in Flast had standing to bring the
Establishment Clause challenge to the congressional exercise of
taxing and spending power under the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965.*4 The Court reasoned that the logical nexus
between the taxpayers' status as taxpayers and the challenged
legislation assured meaningful presentation of the issues to warrant
judicial review.4 For the Warren Court, the standing inquiry, at its
core, was a standard jurisdictional examination not freighted with
constitutional demands or separation of powers concepts.
Taken together, Baker and Flast illustrate that the Supreme Court
during the Warren era focused its standing analysis on whether the
plaintiff in question had properly presented the case in an adversarial
context. While acknowledging the constitutional backdrop in both
cases, the Court expressly rejected separation of powers as an
essential element of the standing inquiry. As these cases show, the
Warren Court believed that the standing analysis was simply an aid to
"limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
resolution through the judicial process.""4 It was a standard
jurisdictional examination that did not involve issues of constitutional
41
42
43
44

Id. at 100-01 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 88, 106.
Id. at 102-03.
Id. at 95.
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structure or power divisions among the branches of government. By
limiting the standing inquiry to whether the plaintiff had alleged an
injury capable of judicial resolution, the Court was able to grant
standing to voters in Baker and federal taxpayers in Flast, even
though political sensitivities were implicated in both cases, and even
though the political process might well have remedied the plaintiffs'

ijuries.
C. The Lasting Imprint of Warren Era "Rights Consciousness"
The civil rights movement in general, and the Warren Court in
particular, profoundly transformed American democracy, resulting in
producing "a growing inclination of people and organized groups to
define politics in terms of rights, a growing willingness of the federal
government to enforce individuals' claims to constitutional rights, and
a widening of the domain of 'politics' propelled by rightsconsciousness. 4 Indeed, some of the rights the landmark cases of the
Warren Court enforced survive as the bedrock of American legal
culture .4 As will be discussed below, this focus on rights-based
constitutionalism presents profound challenges to lawyers, legal
theorists, politicians, and judges who either (a) disagree with rightsbased constitutional orders generally or (b) wish to replace the liberal
rights orientation of the Warren Court with a more conservative
version. To reverse the Warren Court legacy, if possible at all, would
require a kind of judicial stealth where procedural rules such as
standing are manipulated to block access to the federal courts. For
without access to courts, the "democracy of rights" is reduced to a
mere abstraction incapable of being realized.

UI. THE BURGER

COURT RECONSTRUCTS CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS
THROUGH JUDICIAL TECHNIQUE AND PROCEDURAL CHANGE

By the end of the Warren era, judicially enforceable constitutional
rights had become entrenched as a core feature of American
democracy. And although the conservatives on the Burger Court had
criticized the Warren Court's "rights revolution" for undermining the
rule of law, they recognized that this revolution could not easily be
reversed without sacrificing the integrity of the Court and inviting

counter-charges of judicial

activism. 47

In view of this limitation, the

45 MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN

Civic LIFE 242

(1998).
46

See cases cited supra note 22.

47 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS (1970); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975); PHILIP B.
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Burger Court followed the logical path laid open in the wake of the
Warren Court-affect procedure generally, and the standing doctrine
in particular, to dislodge some of the key elements of the prior regime
without sacrificing too much in the way of judicial credibility.
Even so, the Burger Court still had to operate within the
institutional constraints inherited from the Warren Court. The rightsbased constitutionalism of the Warren Court changed the rhetorical
landscape of judicial opinions by framing issues in rights discourse.4
Unable to outright reject this discourse, the Burger Court redirected
the currents of constitutional authority and legitimacy by developing
its own language strategy to reconstitute the meaning of judicially
enforceable constitutional liberties. The resultant discourse had to
blend access to courts with polity principles and thereby locate
responsibility for constitutionalism outside the Court: enter Standing
and Separation of Powers (writ large).
A. The Infeasibility of a FrontalAssault on the Warren Court
Decisions
Richard Nixon's election as President of the United States, in
November 1968, marked the beginning of a conservative shift in

American politics.4 9 However, scholars have lamented that President
Nixon's appointment of Warren Burger as the new Chief Justice in
1969 failed to effect the conservative evisceration of the Warren
Court's liberal holdings and constitutional rights. 50 Indeed, by 1969,
individual liberties and minority rights, so profoundly expanded under
the Warren Court, had become firmly entrenched in American politics
and legal discourse 5' making them difficult to dislodge quickly

KUJRLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 57 (1970); Edward A.

Purcell, Jr., Alexander M. Bickel and the Pos~t-Realist Cons9titution, I11HARv. c.R.-c.L. L. REV.
521, 543-63 (1976).
48 See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 5, 8 (1993) ("One of the most fascinating aspects of the Warren Court revolution is
the resurrection of rights discourse which, prior to the Warren Court's tenure, had been more or
less discredited among Progressives.").
49 See, e.g., DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., CAMPAIGNS AND THE COURT: THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 179-83 (1999) (discussing Nixon's election in
1968 as a political shift).
50 See, e.g., THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER- REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent
Blasi ed., 1983) [hereinafter THE BURGER COURT] (presenting a series of commentaries by
students of the Burger Court's work); THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE
SUPREME COURT 1969-1986 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987) (compiling practical and theoretical
analyses from scholars and experts on the Burger Court's rulings); Albert W. Alschuler, Failed
Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1436, 1437-41 (1987)
(detailing the inconsistency of the Burger Court's decisions).
51 Ronald Dworkin observed as early as the 1970s that "[t]he language of rights now
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without sacrificing the integrity of the judiciary .5 ' Because of these
considerations, the Burger Court's approach proved more subtle and
complex.
1. UnderstandingInherited InstitutionalArrangements
During his 1968 presidential campaign, candidate Nixon promised
to reshape the Court by appointing "'strict constructionists"' who
would rein in the "activism" of the Warren Court.5 True to his word,
President Nixon appointed four Justices in his first term.5 Despite the
change in personnel, however, the Court moved slowly and
incrementally in terms of developing a conservative constitutional
jurisprudence, largely confounding those scholars who had expected a
rapid conservative turnaround. 5 Part of the difficulty with any
attempt to assess changes to constitutional development in terms of
speed is that such attempts fail to appreciate fully the cumulative and
residual effects of what was actually achieved; institutional shifts can
rarely be captured in a snap-shot. In The Most Activist Supreme Court
in History, political science professor Thomas M. Keck points to this
complexity to explain why the conservative regime that succeeded the
constitutional order of the New Deal/Great Society did not supplant
the extension of rights that took place under the Warren Court. Keck
writes: "constitutional development does not in fact proceed by means
of the smooth, wholesale replacement of an existing constitutional

dominates political debate in the United States." RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 184 (1978).
52 For discussions on the Burger Court's expansion of the Warren Court legacies
concerning minority rights, see generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND
SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO
BUSH 11275 (5th ed. 2008) ("The Burger Court, far from reversing or otherwise undoing its
predecessor Waren Court, was marked by a generally surprising penchant for selective liberal
judicial activism, even in such unexpected areas as civil ights and civil liberties."); C'hristopher
E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Unfufilled Aspirations: The Court-Packing Efforts of
Presidents Reagan and Bush, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1111, 1116 (1994) (commenting that the Burger
Court "limitfedl rights for criminal defendants," but "ultimately disappointed conservatives" by
moving "in liberal directions on so many other important issues, most notably in abortion and
affirmative action").
53 A.E. Dick Howard, He Was Not What They Expected, NAT'L L.J., July 10, 1995, at A20
(recalling President Nixon's promise to put "'political conservatives"'. and "'.strict
constructionists"'. on the bench).
54President Nixon's four appointments were: Warren E. Burger as Chief Justice in 1969,
Justice Harry Blackmun in 1970, and Justices Lewis F. Powell and William Rehnquist in 1971.
55 Fifteen years after Nixon's election, the leading scholarly description of the Burger
Court described it as "the counter-revolution that wasn't." THEf BURGER COURT, supra note 50.
While this may have been an accurate assessment of the force of the retrenchment policies of
the Burger Court in 1983, the strength of Blasi's claim weakens when viewed through the eyes
of the Rehnquist Court, which advanced conservative constitutional values based on the Burger
Court's "incremental changes."
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order with an emergent one."5 Mark Tushnet' s use of temporally
distinct "constitutional orders" to describe the displacement of "the
New Deal/Great Society constitutional order" fits into Robert A.
Dahl's political characterization of the Court. "Rather, like political
change more generally, all constitutional change 'proceeds upon a
leaders, ideas,
prior ground, a site, of political arrangements, rules,
57
practices, attitudes, and so on, already in existence."'
Simply put, Keck argues that the Court is subject to the same
constraints on rapid political change that restrict the movement of
other institutions. This realization enlightens our understanding of a
particular Court's impact on constitutional development because it
allows us to evaluate what they did in terms of the limits of what they
could do.
The Burger Court, like all Courts in American history, inhabited a
distinctive political environment that set the limits on its ability to act
and maneuver. In this regard, Stephen Skowronek' s exploration of the
contextual nature of presidential leadership is instructive. In The
Politics Presidents Make, Skowronek examines presidential
leadership based on presidents' structural placement within the
succession of presidents.5 He defines leadership as contingent and
bound by context, and suggests that the authority to act derives from
the political regime, "the commitments of ideology and interest
Thus,
embodied in preexisting institutional arrangements." 5
depending on how presidents relate to the larger political order, some
strategic options become easier to pursue, while others become more
Skowronek crafted a typology that conceptualizes four types of
1
presidents-reconstructive, oppositional, affiliated, and dijntv6
56 KECK, supra note 11, at 4; see also Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:
The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957) (suggesting that
justices are themselves menmbers of the national "lawmaking majorit[y]" because they are drawn
from and appointed by the dominant governing coalition, and therefore, their decisions can be
explained by reference to the policy preferences of the administration that appointed them).
17 KECK, supra note 11, 4 (quoting Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, History and
Governance in the Study of American Political Development (presented at the annual meeting
of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., Aug. 30-Sept. 3, 2000)).
58 STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, TH-E POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN
ADAMS To GEORGE BUSH (1993).
59 Id. at 34.
60 Id. at 34-36. Skowronek refers to the four types of presidents as reconstructive,
disjunctive, preemptive, and articulative. See also Keith E. Whittington, The Political
Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION
MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE 261, 265-66 (Sotirios A. Barber & Robert P. George
eds., 2001). Whittington refers to the four types with slightly different titles-reconstructive.
preemptive, affiliated, and disjunctive.
61 This basic framework draws on Skowronek's more general analysis of presidential
leadership. See generally SKOWRONEK, supra note 58, at 33-58. See also Whittington, supra
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Which category a particular President falls into depends on the
62
resources at his (or her) disposal when pursuing a given agenda.
Reconstructive presidents are antagonistic to the commitments of the
existing, though failing, order and seek to reconstruct a new one.
They accomplish this by reinterpreting the fundamental commuitments
of the inherited regime in new ways consistent with their own
substantive political values and, in this way, reconfigure existing
63
institutional arrangements in their own image. Preemptive or
oppositional presidents come to power by seeking to overthrow the
existing and still dominant governmental philosophy. Not
surprisingly, preemptive presidents are rare in American history, as
they tend to lack the wherewithal to topple an incumbent who remains
popular. Preemptive presidents, however, may win election by hiding
their oppositional intentions during the campaign, only to activate
them once in office.64 Affiliated presidents support the dominant
governing philosophy. They seek "to extend and consolidate what
they have inherited." 65 The last category is the disjunctive president.
These leaders are technically the last affiliated president before a
reconstructive president emerges and establishes a new governing
66
regime.
Presidents, however, are not the only order-dismantling actors on
the American political stage. The Supreme Court also serves as an
important political agent. Like presidents, the Supreme Court inherits
both a political and constitutional situation, which defines its ability
to repudiate or advance the reigning government philosophy. Indeed,
the Court must understand this political and constitutional context to
sense what it can and cannot accomplish. Although direct application
of Skowronek' s work on presidential leadership to the Supreme Court
is inadequate, the concepts underlying his typology are useful for
assessing the Burger Court's attempt to restructure the liberal
constitutional paradigm inherited from the Warren Court. For one
thing, it shows that while individual character is relevant, it does not
define the actions of a particular Court. For a moment, it reminds us
that a Court's "success" is not measured solely by what it did, but
also by what it chose not to do. By placing a given Court in its larger

note 60, at 261, 265-66.
62 SKOWRONEK, supra note 58, at 34-36; see also Whittington, supra note 60, at 261,
265-66.
63 SKOWRONEK, supra note 58, at 36-39; Whittington, supra note 60, at 265.
64 SKOWRONEK, supra note 58, at 43-45; see also Whittington, supra note 60, at 265.
65 Whittington, supra note 60, at 265-66.
66 SKOWRONEK, supra note 58, at 40.
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political and constitutional context, Skowronek' s analytic approach
permits one to critically assess that Court's actions and inactions visA-vis its political competitors-i.e., its ability to retain power by
knowing when and when not to move. As we shall see, the Burger
Court did move, but only cautiously and in a field of inquiry largely
hidden from the lay public: federal civil procedure.
2. The Burger Court as Oppositional
In reviewing its response to the Warren legacy, we see that the
Burger Court most resembles Skowronek' s "oppositional" leader. The
core characteristic of an oppositional leader is, frankly, its
opposition to the dominant governing philosophy. Such leaders are
committed to reversing or changing the inherited dominant governing
regime; however, they do not have the benefit of political capital and
resources to the same extent as reconstructive leaders. Again,
67
presidential studies are instructive. In The Opposition Presidency,
David Crockett describes three methods of conducting an opposition
presidency: the president can mount a frontal attack; undermine the
dominant regime indirectly by constraining it at the margins but
leaving its core principles intact; or proceed with "steady
,,68
administration of the law at the expense of energetic leadership.
Oppositional leaders, whether they be presidents or Supreme Court
majorities, often find themselves frustrated by the intransigence of the
institutional arrangements they have inherited. As Crockett points out,
opposition leaders are
nascent redefiners who are forced to operate in a political
context that will not allow them to achieve their ideal goals.
They are constrained by a definition of politics that took
place before they acquired power, and they must seek a
different path to advance their party or personal agenda.6
Crockett argues that for someone in an oppositional situation, a
strategy of moderation is often more appropriate and effective than
ideological warfare. He concludes that instead of openly dismantling
the governing philosophy and structure, the more successful
oppositional leaders will seek a different method to advance their
agenda, which they accomplish by placing a greater emphasis on the

67 DAVID

A.

CROCKETT, THE OPPOSITION

CONSTRAINTS OF HISTORY (2002).
68
69

Id. at 46.
Id.
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steady administration of the law .70 This particular form of
oppositional leadership well-describes the Burger Court and its
particular posture vis-A-vis the Warren Court, and it helps explain the
gradual but steady ascendance of conservative constitutionalism over
the last thirty-eight years. Below, I explore how the Burger Court, in
this "quiet" form of opposition to the newly established rights-based
jurisprudence of its predecessor, reset the terms of constitutional
discourse and made the emergent conservative politics the new
reference point for future constitutional contests.
B. Retreating into the Politics of Judicial Technique and
Procedural Change
It is not exceptional to describe the Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Warren as decidedly focused on public values. Under the
Warren Court, "schools were ordered desegregated, the Bill of Rights
was made enforceable against the states, First Amendment guarantees
were bolstered, a right to privacy was 'discovered,' criminal
procedure protections were strengthened, and orchestrated school
prayer was made illegal.",7 1 None of this, however, would have been
accomplished had the Court inherited and been forced to apply a
restrictive standing doctrine. This procedural bar would have
prevented the Warren Court from protecting the substantive rights
that have since become its legacy.7
However, in judicial decision-making, as in Newtonian physics,
each action invites an equal and opposite reaction. This is no less true
of the Warren Court's liberal standing doctrine. Review of the major
standing cases of the Burger Court reveals an effort to construct limits
on Article IIn standing as a means of discouraging federal judges from
taking cases that, however socially or politically deserving, intrude
into the decision-making province of either the legislative or the
executive branch 7.
This policy shift on standing occurred in two stages. In the first,
the Court used language that tethered its in-house rules of standing to
Article Ill, elevating the inquiry from a prudential analysis to a
constitutional one. In the second, the Court injected separation of
powers principles into the now-constitutionalized standing rules,
Id. at 46-47.
Gene R. Nichol, Is There a Law of Federal Courts?, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 147, 148-49
(1993) (footnotes omitted).
72 Id. at 149. Dean Nichol observes that from 1954 to the early 1970s, "not only was a
cascade of new substantive rights produced, the Justices also installed a variety of procedural
mechanisms to ensure that the guarantee of those rights would be actually realized." Id.
73 See infra text accompanying notes 66-115.
70
71
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causing the analysis to drift away from the plaintiff and his or her
injury and into the substance of the claim itself. In this way, the
Burger Court began to use the standing inquiry to dip into the merits
of the case to determine if separation of powers concerns were
implicated, then return to the surface and make the jurisdictional
determination of standing.
It should be noted that the Constitution does not discuss standing
to sue or the other justiciability doctrines historically employed by the
Supreme Court. Nor does the Constitution ever employ the phrase
"separation of powers." Nevertheless, the Burger Court successfully
accomplished this two-step transformation through the strategic use
of language that affected legal procedure in the short-term and the
base of constitutional interpretive authority in the long-term. A closer
look at the transformation of the standing doctrine during the Burger
Court suggests that these two procedural moves-characterizing some
standing rules as constitutional barriers and adding separation of
powers discourse to the standing analysis-are more significant to the
retrenchment from rights-based constitutionalism than conventionally
assumed.
The point is not simply that the Court can manipulate the standing
doctrine to "give greater credence to interests of privilege than to
outsider claims of disadvantage." 74 Rather, the point is that the
Court's stated use of standing to defend the conservative ideal of
limited federal court jurisdiction after the Warren era is far more
complicated than its mythic narrative of judicial restraint asserts.
1. Constitutionalizingthe Standing Inquiry by Grounding It in
Article III's "Case and Controversy" Requirement
Once the Burger Court was assured of a conservative majority
among the Justices, it began to redraw the rules of standing and then
relocate the source of those rules squarely within the language of
Article Ell. In a series of cases beginning in 1975, the Court defined
the rules of the standing doctrine to require a plaintiff to show: (1)
75
that he has suffered a concrete and particularized "injury in fact,",
which is imminent rather than hypothetical ;76 (2) that the
injury is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant and not some

74 Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L.
REv. 301, 304 (2002).
15 See Wath v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (holding that a plaintiff must allege
specific, concrete facts showing that the action he has challenged harms him personally).
76 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (requiring that plaintiff
demonstrate a "'live and active claim"').
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third party not before the court; 77 and (3) that a favorable decision
from the Court will likely redress the injury.7 According to the
Burger Court, by limiting federal court jurisdiction to disputes that
met these definitional requirements, Article III ensured that unelected
federal judges would not interfere unnecessarily with policies adopted
through the democratic processes of the political branches of the
federal government or by the states.
Linking the rules of the standing doctrine to the Constitution was
linguistically and politically a brilliant move. It permitted the Court to
assume an objective, legalistic, and superficially apolitical posture
when deciding whether to hear cases brought against the federal
government that implicate individual liberties or egalitarian
principles. Indeed, over the course of its tenure, the Burger Court
stiffened the language and reworked the logic of the elements of the
standing doctrine to narrow the cases eligible for Article InI
adjudication .7 9 First, the Court cluttered the "injury alone" analysis
with causation and redressability issues, which invited discussionsat the jurisdictional stage of litigation-that go to the merits. Next, the
Court modified the language of these additional elements so that
"fairly traceable" was understood as "caused by," and "reasonable
likelihood" was understood as a "guaranteed certainty."
Consequently, the standing discussion moved away from whether the
proper plaintiff was before the Court to whether the evidence
connected the defendant's conduct to the alleged harm. Thus, the
Court would no longer grant standing on a simple showing of
"adverseness;" instead, it now imposed a more demanding test rife
with causation elements. What is more, the Court was able to give
this more rigorous test an air of legitimacy and permanence by
claiming it was consistent with, if not required by, Article III of the
Constitution. To appreciate this point fully, one must trace the
trajectory of the Burger Court's effort to connect the new standing
rules to the Constitution, starting with the case of Warth v. Seldin.

77 See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976) (stating that
Article 111's "case or controversy" language limits the power of federal courts to redress only
those injuries that are traceable to the defendant's action and not those that result from the
actions of an absent party).
78 See id. at 38 ("[W]hen a plaintiffs standing is brought into issue the relevant inquiry is
whether, assuming justiciability of the claim, the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.").
79 The power to define is the power to control any long-term agenda. See, e.g.,

SKOWRONEK,

supra note 58, 68-69,415.
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a. Warth v. Seldin
In Warth v. Seldin80 in 1975, the Court redefined the basic
function of the standing doctrine when it replaced the adverseness
standard articulated in Baker and Flast with a concrete injury
standard.' In Warth, the plaintiffs challenged a Penfield, New York
zoning ordinance that barred construction of low and
moderate-income housing. 82 The plaintiff groups included lowincome individuals seeking affordable housing, taxpayers in a
neighboring city who were forced to assume the burden for extra
construction of low-income housing, a civic action group who
claimed they were harmed by the exclusion of low-income citizens
from their town, and two other entities, including real estate
developers, who claimed they would have built affordable housing in
the area but for the restrictive ordinance.8 The Court denied standing
to the complainants, holding that they did not allege a sufficiently
"distinct and palpable" injury as the result of defendant's conduct
because none of the plaintiffs had "a present, interest" in any. property
subject to the ordinance. 84 The language the Court used in Warth
signals a new type of standing analysis. Words like "concrete" and
"palpable" and "distinct" indicate that the injury in question, to confer
standing, must be personally felt by the would-be plaintiff and result
in real pain of the physical, psychological, or economic kind.
Although a plaintiff might articulate a claim that makes him or her
"adverse" to the government defendant, this is not enough. According
to the Court in Warth, the Constitution requires that the plaintiff
present with an injury that can be quantified, measured,
photographed, or healed-i.e., an injury that is "distinct and
palpable." This is more than raising the bar on standing, it is imbuing
new language with constitutional authority. Indeed, the Court's
statement that "distinct," "palpable" and "particularized" injury is
required to cast a legal dispute "in a form traditionally capable of
judicial resolution" functions as rhetorical misdirection, falsely
leading the reader to believe that such concrete injury has historically
been a standing requirement, when in fact it has not.

422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Id. at 499-501, 507.
Id. at 493-94.
83 Id. at 494-95, 497-98.
84 Id. at 501, 504.
80
81
82
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b. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization
The year following Warth v. Seldin, the Court decided Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization," in which it
constitutionalized the remaining two elements of its Article III case or
controversy requirement: causation and redressability. In Simon,
several indigent individuals and the organizations representing them
brought action against the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") challenging
an IRS revision of a Revenue Ruling lim-iting the amount of free
medical care that hospitals receiving tax-exempt status were required
to provide .86 Previously, to secure tax-exempt status, hospitals were
required to provide free care to indigents.8 Under the revision, only
emergency medical treatment of indigents was required.8 The
indigents alleged that the revision caused them injury because it
permitted tax-exempt hospitals to deny them all but emergency
medical treatment .89 The Court required that the plaintiffs' injury
"fairly [could] be traced" to the defendant's conduct and imposed a
burden on the plaintiffs to show that the injury was likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision. 90 The Court denied standing on
grounds that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the causation and
redressability prongs of the standing inquiry.9 '
As with the terms "distinct," "palpable," and "particularized"
injury in Warth, the concept of being "fairly traceable" was new to
the Court's judicial lexicon, at least in the standing context. Even
more than the concrete injury rule, however, the "fairly traceable"
requirement demanded an evidentiary showing of causation. The
focus of the inquiry no longer was whether the plaintiff could state an
adverse claim against the defendant, but whether the defendant's
actions actually caused injury to the plaintiff. "Redressability" was
also a new term as applied to standing, as it looked not at the dispute
between the plaintiff and defendant, but at the court's ability to
fashion a remedy-again, not an issue typically assessed during
threshold determinations of jurisdiction under Article III.
- 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
96 Id. at 28.
87 Id. at 28-30.
88 Id. at 28.
89 Id. at 33.
91 Id. at 42-46 (discussing that plaintiffs' inability to prove, first, that the IRS revision
caused the hospitals to reduce the amount of care to the poor, and, second, that the requested
remedy, a court order rescinding the revision, would produce plaintiffs' desired effect of causing
the hospital to restore its medical service to the indigents; to pre-revision levels).
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There is nothing inherently constitutional about injury, causation,
and redressability. The Warth and Simon Courts, however, elevated
these rules of the standing doctrine to constitutional status. Wart/i's
shift of the standing inquiry focus from adverseness to concrete injury
coupled with Simon's discussion of the significance of causation and
redressability provided the Court with the foundational components
of its standing analysis. Six years later, in Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 92the Court would confer upon the entire tripartite analysis the
full weight and legitimacy of the Constitution.
c. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, Inc.
In Valley Forge, the plaintiffs (federal taxpayers), brought suit
challenging a transfer of federal property made by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare under the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act.9 According to the plaintiffs, the
Department transferred the land to the Valley Forge Christian College
for the express purpose of training men and women for Christian
service, thus violating the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 94 The Court denied standing, concluding that the
plaintiffs had not suffered a sufficiently cognizable injury. 9 5 When
addressing whether the plaintiffs had a right to seek federal judicial
redress, Justice Rehnquist summarized the newly constitutionalized
standing analysis as a three-part test of injury in fact, causation, and
redressability:
Article IH of the Constitution limits the "judicial power"
of the United States to the resolution of '"cases"~ and
"controversies.....
As an incident to the elaboration of this bedrock
requirement, this Court has always required that a litigant
have "standing" to challenge the action sought to be
adjudicated in the lawsuit. The term "standing" subsumes a
blend of constitutional requirements and prudential
considerations, and it has not always been clear in the
92

454 U.S. 464 (1982).

Id. at 467-69; see Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, ch. 288,
63 Stat. 377.
93
94

Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 469-70;

law respecting an establishment of religion .
95 Valley

Forge, 454 U.S. at 476-82.

see U.S. CONST.

amend. I ("Congress shall make no
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opinions of this Court whether particular features of the
"standing" requirement have been required by Art. MI ex
propric vigore, or whether they are requirements that the
Court itself has erected and which were not compelled by the
language of the Constitution.
A recent line of decisions, however, has resolved that
ambiguity, at least to the following extent: at an irreducible
minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's
authority to "show that he personally has suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal
conduct of the defendant," and that the injury "fairly can be
traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision."9
Valley Forge neatly capped the Burger Court's piecemeal
definitional adjustments to the standing doctrine. The opinion
queried whether the rules of standing obtained authority from Article
111, making them constitutional, or from judicial creativity, making
them prudential. The decision affirmed the rules' constitutional status
simply by declaring it so. Notwithstanding the admitted ambiguity of
the case law, the opinion simply relied on its own earlier decisions,
i.e., Warth and Smith. This is problematic precisely because the Court
largely rejected authorities that disputed its interpretation of the
constitutional status of the standing rules, i.e., Flast and Baker.
Despite the existence of this dispute, the opinion failed to consider in
any meaningful way the actual status issue. The Court's exclusive
reliance on only one line of cases to justify its contention that the
standing features derived from Article Ill merely accords with its own
earlier descriptions of the standing doctrine. Although the support on
which the majority opinion relied does not justify the Court's
conclusion, the opinion indelibly endowed the features of the standing
analysis with the authority of the Constitution.
2. The Burger Court Infuses Standing with the Discourse of
Separation of Powers
As shown above, the Burger Court, through certain linguistic
shifts and some rather bold judicial declarations, effectively
constitutionalized the standing doctrine and its three fundamental
96 Id. at 471-72 (citing warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 97 (1968)) (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979);
Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 4 1).
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elements: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Simultaneously
with this effort, the Burger Court also began to redesign the function
of the standing inquiry as a whole, morphing it from a threshold
jurisdictional question, concerned with whether the proper party was
before the Court, into a political determination regarding the proper
role of the federal judiciary in a separated government.
On its face, this was a strange thing to do that was hardly intuitive
at all. Not only is the separation of powers discourse at odds with the
development of the standing doctrine, it uses language and concepts
foreign to the standing inquiry's very function. Even the Burger
Court's new standing rules-injury, causation, and redressabilityare unrelated to separation of powers. The injury element requires that
the plaintiff have something at stake, and the causation and
redressability elements ensure that the defendant's conduct, and the
Court's relief, are related to the plaintiff's injury. None of these
elements logically entails separation of powers principles. What, then,
compelled the Burger Court to begin freighting the standing inquiry
with separation of powers discourse?
Below, I attempt to answer this question by assessing four of the
major standing decisions the Burger Court issued. Each builds upon
the other, as the Court incrementally refashions the standing inquiry
from a threshold test of the plaintiff's ability to present an adversarial
claim, to a loose, standardless assessment of the political limits of the
Court's authority vis-A-vis the federal agency implicated in the suit.
a. United States v. Richardson
In United States v. Richardson,97 a taxpayer filed suit to compel
the Central Intelligence Agency to publish its budget 9. Plaintiffs
alleged that the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, which authorized
secrecy for the Agency's accounts, 9 9 violated the Statement and
Account Clause of the Constitution. 100 The Court characterized
Richardson's injury as a generalized grievance about the conduct of
government and denied standing because his alleged injury was
"4,common to all members of the public."' 10' The majority was
-418 U.S. 166 (1974).
Id. at 168-69.
99 Id. at 169. The Act permits the Agency to account for its expenditures "solely on the
certificate of the Director." 50 U.S.C. § 403j(b) (2000).
100Richardson, 418 U.S. at 167-68; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, ci. 7 ("No Money shall he
98

drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
from time to time.").
101Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176-77 (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)
(holding that plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the validity of the appointment of
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satisfied that the absence of a unique injury in the plaintiff "gives
support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the
102
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process."
Implicit in the Court's rationale was the idea that, under separation of
powers principles, claims against the federal government, if shared by
03
all citizens, should be reserved exclusively to the elected branches.,
b. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War
In the second case, Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War,'04 a companion case to Richardson, military reservists
challenged the constitutionality of a policy allowing members of
Congress to serve concurrently in the Reserves. The plaintiffs, an
anti-war group and certain named members, alleged the policy
violated the Incompatibility Clause of the Constitution.105 They
sought relief through a writ of mandamus against the Secretary of
Defense to force him to remove members of Congress from the
Reserves.' 0 6 The Court held that plaintiffs had neither taxpayer nor
citizen standing, and stressed the importance of a "discrete factual
context within which the concrete injury occurred."107 The Court
reasoned that without the "discrete factual context," the plaintiffs'
claim was a generalized grievance, which would require that the

Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, who had been nominated while a member of the Senate,
under the Ineligibility Clause of Article 1, § 6 of the Constitution because whatever Levitt's
injury, "it [was] not sufficient that he ha[d] merely a general interest common to all members of
the public")).
'02Id. at 179.
103Justice Powell, concurring, expanded on this last point. He argued:
Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion of
judicial power. It seems to me inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or
citizen standing would significantly alter the allocation of power at the national level,
with a shift away from a democratic form of government. I also believe that repeated
and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch and the
representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to
either. The public confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to the
latter may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our
power to negative the actions of the other branches, We should be ever mindful of
the contradictions that would arise if a democracy were to permit general oversight
of the elected branches of government by a nonrepresentative, and in large measure
insulated, judicial branch.

Id. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
1-'418 U.S. 208 (1974).
'05 Id. at 209-11; see U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 6, cI. 2 ("[N]o Person holding any Office under
the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.").
1

06Schlesinger,

107Id.

at 222.

418 U.S. at 211.
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Court fashion relief beyond the needs of the parties before it.'0 8 The
Court concluded that this danger of overreaching was especially
problematic "when the relief sought produces a confrontation with
one of the coordinate branches of the Government.""1 Thus, in part,
the Court denied standing in Schlesinger because it felt the plaintiffs'
injury too abstract. However, as it did in Richardson, the Court
implied that it may consider separation of powers principles during its
jurisdictional determination and deny standing based on the
implications of interfering with the other branches.
One must stop for a moment to grasp how poorly these two
concepts work together in a judicial opinion. It is one thing to
demand a high level of specificity with respect to the plaintiffs
injury; one may gain some comfort in the fact that this requirement
relates thematically to the traditional standing inquiry and the need
for courts to assure themselves that they have before them a proper
plaintiff. It is something different altogether, however, to mix this
analysis with one involving concerns of inter-branch intrusion, and
then to claim that this odd blend of analyses is what Article III
requires prior to a finding of federal court jurisdiction. Neither the
text of the Constitution nor logic generally supports such a
determination.
c. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc.
The Burger Court intensified its politicization of the standing
doctrine eight years later in Valley Forge.1"0 In denying standing,
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, located the source of the
plaintiff s challenge not in the constitutionality of a congressional act,
but rather a
the Federal Property Administrative Services Act,'
particular executive branch action arguably authorized by the Act.
This was a subtle, deftly-powerful intellectual move, and it marked an
important break with the Warren Court's approach to cases brought
against the federal government.

108Id.
109q
Id.
1'0Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Anis. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464 (1982). Note that I use the term "politicization" in a non-pejorative sense (if that is
possible). It simply means that the Court had incorporated political concerns regarding
separation of powers into the standing inquiry, which is conventionally understood to be a
strictly legal analysis.
MId. at 466-67; see Federal Property and Adm-inistrative Services Act of 1949, ch. 288,
63 Stat. 377..
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This requires amplification. Recall that in Flast, the plaintiffs filed
suit against the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, alleging
that the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965-or the
Secretary's implementation of the Act-was unconstitutional. The
Warren Court granted standing, without trying to tease apart these
alternative claims, no doubt thinking that for purposes of adjudicating
the complaint, the distinction between them was immaterial. In Valley
Forge, however, Rehnquist seized on this distinction. With Flast well
in mind, Rehnquist opted to differentiate between acts of Congresswhich are legislative-and the actions of the President and his staffwhich are executive. While the first have been subject to judicial
review since Marbury v. Madison,'1 the second have not and, in
Rehnquist' s view, should never be. What makes Rehnquist' s position
significant is that it sets in motion the process by which the Court
created space for the executive branch to operate with minimal
judicial oversight.
Ultimately, Rehnquist' s majority opinion in Valley Forge held that
no one had standing to sue-i.e., no one could be a plaintiff-to
challenge the decision of the federal government to give a seventyseven-acre plot of federal land to a Christian college with the selfdescribed mission of "'train[ing] leaders for church related
ministries .""... Although the Court's stated rationale for denying
standing was plaintiff's failure to present a sufficiently concrete
particularized injur,' 14 the extensive discussion about reluctance to
review the conduct of the executive branch signaled the Court's
growing reliance on separation of powers principles to deny standing.
Indeed, the Court in Valley Forge effectively recast the standing
doctrine as a constitutional check against judicial intrusion into the
policy prerogatives of the political branches: "[iln this manner does
Art. III limit the federal judicial power 'to those disputes which
confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system of separated
powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution
5
through the judicial process.""'0

Yet nothing in the language of Valley Forge-orthat of any other
Supreme Court opinion-effectively explains why separation of
powers concerns must be entwined with the standing inquiry. Indeed,
1125

U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).

113Valley
4

Forge, 454 U.S. at 468.

11Md.at 485. The Court concluded that access to federal court is predicated on the
complainant's ability to "identify any personal injury suffered . .. as a consequence of the
alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by
observation of conduct with which one disagrees." Id.
115ld. at 472 (quoting Elast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)).
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by tangling separation of powers principles with standing, the Court
has injected an undefined set of analytically unrelated concepts about
the role of separated government into the jurisdictional determination
of whether the plaintiff before the Court has presented a dispute
framed in an adversarial context, which the Court is able to resolve.
Intellectually, this is a very unsatisfactory (and unsatisfying)
mixture of disparate ideas. However, from a juridical or political
perspective, linking separation of powers to standing has a certain
brilliance, as it imposes a jurisdictional barrier to the kind of rightsbased litigation that flourished during the Warren Court, while
allowing the Court to assume a non-activist posture.
d. Allen v. Wright
Although the text of* Valley Forge clearly indicated that separation
of powers concerns play a role in the standing inquiry, it was
somewhat vague as to just how large that role is or should be. Any
confusion on this point, however, was erased four years later in the
case of Allen v. Wright.1 16 Indeed, more than any other decision of the
Burger Court, Allen worked the most profound change in the Court's
rhetoric concerning the purpose of the standing doctrine. In forceful,
declarative language, Justice O'Connor' s majority opinion made the
Court's position clear: "the law of Art. III standing is built on a single
basic idea-the idea of separation of powers.""' 1 With this one
sentence, the Court completed its effort to reformulate the standing
inquiry as a separation of powers tool.
In Allen, the parents of black schoolchildren sued the IRS, alleging
that the IRS' s failure to deny tax-exempt status to private schools that
practiced racial discrimination constituted federal support for such
schools and interfered with efforts to desegregate public schools."' 8
The Court, for the first time, expressly relied on separation of powers
principles to deny plaintiffs standing. While conceding that the
plaintiffs' injury-diminished ability to attend racially integrated
schools-was sufficiently concrete to satisfy the traditional injury in
116468 U.S. 737 (1984).
7

111d. at 752. Unlike implicit references to separation of powers considerations to the
standing inquiry made in previous cases, O'Connor's opinion in Allen
explicitly notes that separation of powers concerns do not underlie article Ill1
jurisdictional limitations merely in the sense that plaintiffs who lack standing are
outside the area of judicial responsibility. Rather, the three components of article M1
standing are themselves to be interpreted in light of "separation of powers
principles."
Nichol, Abusing Standing, supra note 1,at 641 (footnotes omitted).
"18AIlen, 468 U.S. at 746.
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fact component of Article Ill standing, the Court determined that
the plaintiffs' claim failed the causation element because the alleged
injury was not "fairly traceable to the Government conduct" that the
plaintiffs had challenged."19 This causation analysis, however, was
infused with separation of powers considerations because the Court
emphasized the importance of dismissing suits that challenged
"particular programs [that government] agencies establish to carry out
their legal obligations."" 0
With the Allen decision, the Burger Court transformed the standing
doctrine's function from determining the plaintiff's right to litigate to
determining the proper role of the federal courts when government
actors are sued. 12 ' The decision also finished the job begun in other
decisions. Where Richardson, Schlesinger, and Valley Forge had
chipped away at the traditional notions of standing, Allen smashed
them and replaced them with something completely different. The
Baker and Flast standard of ensuring adverseness of the parties no
longer directed the standing inquiry; instead, preserving separation of
powers controlled.
As I have shown in this section, the Burger Court developed rules
to define its standing inquiry and then located those rules within the
Constitution. That is, it grounded the rules of standing in the "Case or
Controversy" language of Article Ell, thus making the specifics of a
prudentially-crafted standing inquiry a constitutional mandate.
Coupled with, and dependent upon, this development was the Court's
effort to incorporate separation of powers concerns into the standing
inquiry. The Burger Court's infusion of separation of powers
discourse into the inherited standing analysis of the Warren Court was
a strategic use of language. Given that the Burger Court's political
task was to reinterpret the old regime-i.e., to reconcile the Court's
new political commitments (mostly conservative) with the inherited
constitutional order (mostly liberal)-it could not simply claim
legitimacy on completely new grounds. The new Court had to work
subtly, behind the dual screens of legal procedure and judicial
language, neither of which is easily penetrated by the lay public, no
matter how observant. The importance of these two shifts in the
Court's jurisdictional analysis cannot be overstressed, as together they
9

11
Id. at 75 7.
20

1 Id. at 759.
121Id. at 761. The Allen Court expressly stated that the proper role of the federal courts,
"grounded as it is in the idea of separation of powers," is to refrain from interfering with the
executive branch's ability to establish its own policies. Id. Separation of powers principles
11counsel[] against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal
obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus
established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties." Id.
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lay the foundation upon which subsequent Courts have realized the
shift from rights-based constitutionalism to executive-centered
constitutionalism.
It is ultimately impossible to ascertain the Burger Court's precise
motivation in reformulating the standing doctrine. Still, Skowronek' s
theory of the "oppositional" leader allows us to understand the Burger
Court's actions in a political context. Burger and his fellow
conservative Justices inherited from the Warren Court a set of
constraints and pathways that presented both risks and opportunities.
In light of the Burger Court's desire to dial back the rights-based
jurisprudence of the Warren era, it is not surprising that it selected the
standing doctrine as its preferred tool for achieving this objective: it
has the dual benefit of being both superficially innocuous and
practically devastating. Viewed in this light, the Burger Court's
decision to reframe the discourse on standing was highly rational.
Yet, even if one dismisses this interpretation as overly calculating, the
Court's efforts to recast the standing inquiry can also be explained as
sensitivity to propriety-i.e., a sense of appropriateness about what
kinds of behaviors or motivations are considered acceptable under
certain circumstances. 12Taking
either posture with the Burger
Court-calculation or propriety-the result is the same: what a Court
can do is dictated by context. A review of how the Burger Court
analyzed standing is enough to realize the overall effect of its
standing jurisprudence: to limit access where parties sought resolution
of controversial social issues and vindication of rights the
Constitution was designed to protect.12
The Burger Court decisions refused to recognize that Flast
explicitly rejected the notion that Article Ill limitations intersected
with separation of powers problems. 14This
refusal blurs the
difference between compelling prudential reasons for the Court not to

interfere and a jurisdictional duty "to say what the law

is."'2 5'

This

difference goes to the heart of the distinction between whether
judicial power exists versus whether judicial power should be
122
See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, PresidentialChallenges to Judicial Supremacy and the
Politics of Constitutional Meaning, 33 POLITy 365, 394 (2001) (discussing orientation to
context from a presidential leadership perspective).
123See, e.g., Michael A. Berch, Unchain the Courts-An Essay on the Role of the Federal
Courts in the Vindication of Social Rights, 1976 ARtz. ST. L.J. 437; Abram Chayes, The Role of
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1304-05 (1976); Robert Allen
Sedler, Standing and the Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposals for Legislative
Reform, 30 RUJTGERS L. REV. 863, 873-74 (1977); Mark V. Tiishnet, The New Law of Standing:
A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663, 663-64 (1977).
24
1 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1968).
25
1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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exercised. What the Burger Court did by constitutionalizing the
standing doctrine analysis and infusing it with separation of powers
concerns was to obscure this distinction beyond recognition.
III. THE REHNQUIST COURT USED THE STANDING DOCTRINE TO
CREATE A CONSTITUTIONAL "SPACE" FOR PRESIDENTIAL ACTION

The preceding analysis of the Burger Court's standing decisions
indicates that the Court made a steady, if incremental, effort to embed
the modem rules of standing in Article El's limitation of judicial
power. The analysis also reveals that the Court added a separation of
powers component to the standing inquiry, even though neither the
Constitution nor the history of standing jurisprudence suggested that
standing must or should carry the water on such a deeply political
issue. Because of these changes, the rights-based constitutionalism of
the Warren Era, while nominally undisturbed, began to lose ground.
Plaintiffs bringing rights-based challenges against federal actors
increasingly found their access to federal courts curtailed.
However, to appreciate fully what the Burger Court achieved in
the name of constitutional conservatism, one must look at the
decisions of the Rehnquist Court that followed, for the Rehnquist
Court built upon the jurisdictional foundations laid down by its
predecessor and moved the political core of the Court well to the
right, where it has remained ever since. In the process, the Rehnquist
Court enhanced the independence and power of the President, often at
the expense of the very class of litigants that the Warren Court sought
to empower-individuals with grievances against government actors.
Indeed, the quiet legacy of the Rehnquist Court is its
manipulation of the standing doctrine to create a kind of protective
space for the executive branch where it could act without judicial
intrusion.
Scholars have remarked that the congressional delegation of
certain legislative functions to the executive branch, coupled with
presidential use of executive orders and signing statements, have
changed the dynamic of power in the federal government.126 Power
126 For historical discussions of shifts in institutional power in favor of the executive, see,

for example, M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2d ed.
1998); Hugh Helco, What Has Happened to the Separation of Powers?, in SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND

GOOD

GOVERNMENT

131, 138 (Bradford P. Wilson & Peter W. Schramm eds.,

1994). For more contemporary treatments, see PHILLIP J. COOPER, By ORDER OF THE
PRESIDENT: THE USE AND AB3USE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION ix (2002) (revealing that there
has been virtually no significant policy area or level of government that presidents have not
sought to enter and control by virtue of their use of executive orders, presidential memoranda,
proclamations, national security directives, and signing statements, instruments Cooper defines

as "presidential power tools");

KENNETH

R. MAYER,

WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE
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has shifted markedly in favor of the President. 12 1 Under the guise of
separation of powers, the judiciary has contributed to this shift by
relinquishing its authority to address potential constitutional
violations and abuses by the executive branch.12 8 Moreover, the
judiciary has resisted legislative efforts to create legal constraints on
presidential prerogative.129 Below, I argue that the Rehnquist Court
used the reformulated standing doctrine inherited from the Burger
Court to divest Congress of the authority to grant standing to citizens
30
seeking to challenge alleged executive branch violations of law.'1
This, in turn, created constitutional space for the President to act,
largely immune from congressional oversight and public
enforcement. In this way, the Court has helped provide the presidency
with the institutional and legal means to extend its reach beyond the
powers granted it under Article 11 of the Constitution. By articulating
the standing doctrine in this way, the Rehnquist Court also facilitated
the Presidentialists' theory of the unitary executive and allowed them
to promote it as a viable alternative power structure for the federal
government.
In this section, I describe the basic facets of the unitary executive
theory and discuss its emergence and development during the
administrations of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill

ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 81 (2001) (concluding that executive orders have become
more substantive in nature over time, that the number of significant executive orders issued each
year has increased since the 1950s, and that the "percentage of executive orders that deal with
foreign affairs, executive branch administration, and domestic policy has grown significantly
since the 1930s"); Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders
in Modem-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 2 (2002) ("The increased use of executive orders and
other presidential directives is a fundamental problem in modem-day America."); Leanna M.
Anderson, Note, Executive Orders, "The Very Definition of Tyranny, " and the Congressional
Solution, the Separation of Powers Restoration Act, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 589, 611 (2002)
(discussing an increase in the use of executive orders and their ability to "upset the balance of
the separation of powers by concentrating legislative power in the executive branch").
127See, e.g., HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS (2005); Curtis A. Bradley & Eric
A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307
(2006).
2
' 8 See LISA A. KLoPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: How THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS
HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW (2001) (arguing that, during the tenure
of Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist, the Supreme Court excessively invoked the
constitutional avoidance doctrine to surrender its authority to make substantive decisions in hard
and important cases, preferring instead to rely on avoidance strategies such as the doctrines of
justiciability, federalism, and separation of powers). But see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111
(2000) (concluding that the judiciary was required to address the Article II question without
even mentioning the political question doctrine). Indeed, in Bush v. Gore, the Justices took for
granted that they had the "responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the
judicial system has been forced to confront." Id.
129
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see also infra discussion
accompanying notes 212-40.
3
1 0 See Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.
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Clinton-i.e., 1981 to 2001, the two decades that form the core of the
Rehnquist Court. Next, I address the case of Morrison v. Olson,1 ' in
which a near-unanimous Court rejected the Reagan administration's
efforts to advance the unitary executive theory in a blatant conflict
with Congress over the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics
in Government Act. While this case would appear to run counter to
my argument concerning the Rehnquist Court's acceptance of
unilateral presidential action, it was actually the first and necessary
step in introducing the unitary executive theory into the judicial
context. Moreover, as I show, the Morrison decision did not solidify
judicial resistance to expanded presidential power under the unitary
executive theory. Despite Morrison, the Court did not reject all claims
of unitary executive power, as one might have expected. Instead, the
Court accepted a toned-down version of the unitary executive theory,
one that fit more easily within the existing judicial arrangement. The
Rehnquist Court accomplished this, in part, by embedding notions of
executive branch primacy in the standing doctrine. None of this, of
course, would have been possible without the earlier efforts of the
Burger Court to infuse the standing inquiry with separation of powers
concerns and paint it with a constitutional gloss.
The connection between the Court's modern standing doctrine and
the unitary executive is not obvious; but neither is it unexpected. The
Court's gradual move to (1) impose stricter standing criteria, and (2)
freight the standing inquiry with separation of powers concerns,
pushed back the rights-based jurisprudence of the Warren Court and
created a protective space for executive branch action. And although
that space nascently existed during the Warren Court, it was
obliterated when the Watergate scandal caused the public to distrust
the office of the President. In short, the new standing doctrine
responds to both the Warren Court's con stitutionalism and the postWatergate constraints on executive action. The unitary executive
theory was borne out of the same concerns and responds to the same
threats to presidential authority. Indeed, both developments-the
changes to the standing doctrine and the emergence of the unitary
executive theory-occurred (roughly speaking) at the same time.
A. The Unitary Executive Theory
After Watergate and the publication of Arthur Schlesinger's, The
Imperial P residency,' 32 the public and Congress sought to rein in
presidential power. Consequently, the presidential office looked for
131487 U.S. 654 (1988).
32ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
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other outlets that would allow the President to govern with minimal
interference from Congress and the courts. Administrative agencies
provided the President with a logical power-base from which to
circumvent congressional oversight. Indeed, executive branch
agencies would allow the President to accomplish what he was unable
to accomplish legislatively. Thus, it was during this period that the
importance of executive orders and signing statements began to
increase steadily.133 This blending of traditional presidential power
with quasi-legislative authority epitomizes in practice the theory of
the unitary executive.
A product of the late twentieth century, the theory of the unitary
executive advocates a form of consolidated presidential power that
effectively insulates the executive branch from regulation and
oversight from Congress and the judiciary, while giving the President
the authority to make laws outside the conventional legislative
process. Ironically, this tends to immunize such laws from judicial
challenge. The theory serves as the foundation for a governmental
scheme that places the executive at the apex of the political and legal
system. It is, in short, a response to the movement to curb
presidential power in the wake of executive abuses during the late
sixties and seventies. 134 Every President since Reagan has embraced
this theory in practice, though some more overtly than others. What is
more, each of these presidents has recast what was initially a
defensive response to legislative constraints on presidential action
into an offensive strategy to promote executive power.
Rather than discuss the relative merits and dangers of the unitary
35
-it is sufficient
executive-a task shouldered by others elehr
133'See,

e.g., COOPER, supra note 126, at 13-16 (discussing the president's use of executive

orders).
3

1 4"See generally SCHLESINGER. JR., supra note 132 (discussing events such as President
Johnson's Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and President Nixon's secret war in Cambodia and the
Watergate break-in).
'35 See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008) (undertaking a detailed historical
and legal examination of presidential power and arguing that all presidents have been committed
proponents of the theory of the unitary executive); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H.
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REV.
1153 (1992); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994). But see JOHN P. MACKENZIE, ABSOLUTE POWER: How
THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY IS UNDERMINING THE CONSTITUTION (2008) (arguing that
the unitary executive theory has no basis in history and is subversive of a constitutional system
of checks and balances); A. Michael Frooinkin, T"he Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 1346, 1347 (1994) ("[A] proper structural analysis of the Constitution
undermines the constitutional case for an executive branch with a chain of command organized
along military lines and instead emphasizes the existence of a discernible balance between
Congress's role in structuring the executive and the President's inherent and default powers.");
Cass R. Sunstein, The Myth of the Unitary Executive, 7 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 299, 300-01 (1993)
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here to recognize that debate over the unitary executive theory began
during the Reagan years and has never ceased. Full engagement in
that debate is outside the scope of this Article. My purpose here is to
argue that the very existence of that debate requires that one take a
closer look at the Supreme Court's transformation of the standing
doctrine as a tool that can be used to advance the unitary executive
theory.
The unitary executive theory has three basic components: (1)
departmentalism, which asserts that the President's power to interpret
the Constitution is at least equal to that of the Court or Congress; (2)
exciusivism, which asserts that all executive power under the
Constitution rests solely with the President; and (3) executive power
protectionism, which holds that the executive powers of the President
may not constitutionally be appropriated, divested, or diluted by

Congress.136

1. "Departmentalism" in ConstitutionalInterpretation
The unitary executive theory grows out of the principles of
"'departmentalism"' and "'coordinate construction,"' which hold that
"1all three branches of the federal government have the power and
duty to interpret the Constitution and that the meaning of the
Constitution is determined through the dynamic interaction of all
three branches." 137 In other words, departmentalists and coordinate
constructionists believe that presidents and other government officers
can and should engage in independent constitutional reasoning.138 For

(arguing that the idea that the Constitution "put the President on top of a pyramid, with the
administration below him. ...
is an ahistorical myth").
36
1 See generally CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 135.
137Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary
Executive in the Modem Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 606 (2005).
138
See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT vii, 15, 61 (1938) (providing a
historical and theoretical treatise bifurcating the doctrine of judicial review into a "juristic"
conception, granting the courts supreme authority to interpret the Constitution, and a
"departmentalist" conception, removing constitutional interpretation from the peculiar province
of the courts and placing responsibility for interpretive authority equally among the three
branches. The question of primacy in interpretation is resolved by determining the degree of
deference the Constitution requires the political branches give to relevant judicial decisions.
This reconceptualization then confines judicial interpretations to the case in which it is
pronounced. Accordingly, judicial interpretations are "not final against the political forces to
which a changed opinion may give rise."); see also Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The
Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 40], 417 (1986) (analyzing
judicial supremacy, legislative supremacy, and departmentalism to construct a "modified
version of departmentalism" that relies on assessing "degrees of deference one institution owes
another under varying circumstances").
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unitary theorists, departmentalism provides constitutional support for
their assertion that the President's interpretive power is at least
co-equal to that of the other branches. In support of this position, they
cite James Madison's Federalist49, in which Madison states, "[tihe
several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their
common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an
exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their
11139
respective powers ....
In its most non-threatening form, departmentalism is merely the
"dialogue" that occurs naturally between the branches as each takes
action consistent with its view of the Constitution and as they work
together toward a common understanding of what the Constitution
requires. 140 Such dialogues do not cause concern because they do not
meaningfully challenge judicial primacy in interpreting the
Constitution for purposes of actual legal precedent and enforcement.
The more aggressive form of departmentalism, however, does not
accept judicial primacy per se and argues that when the two political
branches clash, the judiciary's constitutional interpretation will not
14
necessarily defeat that of the President. 1
2. All Executive Power Rests in the President
The unitary executive theory holds that all executive power rests in
the office of the President. For this proposition, unitary theorists rely
on the Vesting Clause of Article II, which states, "[tlhe executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." 14 2 Proponents of the unitary executive theory use this
language in conjunction with that of the Take Care Clause, "[the
President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"143 to
argue that the Constitution creates a "hierarchical, unified executive
department under the direct control of the President."'"4 By definition,
39

THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 196 1).
140See, e.g., NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: ELECTED GOVERNMENT,
THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE ABORTION DEBATE (1996); Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988) (discussing constitutional
interpretation as a political convergence of judicial and non-judicial interpretations among the
three branches of government); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L.
REv. 577 (1993).
141See Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation:
Who Determines ConstitutionalMeaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 110, 222 (2004)
(contrasting judicial supremacy and departmentalism and claiming that the President should
refuse to enforce judicial decrees he determines are unconstitutional after "executive review").
142U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 1. el. 1.
14US CONST. art. 11,§ 3, cI. 4.
144 Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 135, at 1165. For the seminal article advancing the
unitary executive theory, see id; see also Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch
1
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then, this argument posits that the Constitution prohibits Congress
from creating agencies and special counsels independent of the
executive branch, as these would violate executive unity.
3. Executive Power Cannot Be Appropriated, Divested, or
Diluted by Congress
Not only does the unitary executive theory maintain that Congress
has no constitutional right to exercise executive power on its own, it
also holds that Congress has no right to appropriate, divest, or dilute
the executive powers that rest in the President.145 According to the
unitary executive theory, Congress may not lawfully create
independent agencies, authorities, or other entities that (1) are not
controlled by the President and (2) exercise discretionary executive,
and sometimes quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers.146 This
constitutional prohibition is categorical and applies even if the
congressionally created agency or entity is to be governed by officials
nominated by the President. This "protectionist" rationale assumes
that under Article II and basic separation of powers principles, the
Constitution vests only the President with the authority to execute the
laws in the executive branch. Thus, the President, and the President
alone, may (1) "remove subordinate policy-making officials at will";
(2) "direct the manner in which subordinate officials exercise
discretionary executive power"; and (3) "veto or nullify such
47
officials' exercises of discretionary executive power."1
B. The Unitary Executive Theory: PoliticalDiscourseArguing for
ConsolidatedPresidentialPower over the Executive Branch
Despite the questionable validity of the unitary executive theory,
its influence on modem presidential politics is undeniable. It has also
had a significant impact on the academy, especially in the area of
constitutional law. Not surprisingly, the two individuals most often
cited for advancing the unitary executive theory, the Honorable
Edwin Meese, 111, and Steven G. Calabresi, herald from the same
place-the Department of Justice ("DOJ") of the Reagan

Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 219, 228 (1993) (arguing that the Take Care
Clause obligates the President to faithfully execute the law personally and to oversee that the
executive branch agencies faithfully execute the law).
5
11
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 135, at 594-95.
146Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 135, at 1165-66.
'47Yoo, Calabresi & Colangelo, supra note 137, at 607; see also Calabresi & Rhodes,
supra note 135, at 1165-66.
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administration. Meese was Reagan's Attorney General, while
Calabresi joined the DOJ in 1985 after co-founding the Federalist
Society in 1982. Since 1990, Calabresi has been a law professor at
Northwestern University School of Law where he has written
148
extensively on the unitary executive.
That Meese and Calabresi both came out of the DOJ is significant
in that these two individuals-and virtually every Presidentialist who
has followed them-believed the unitary executive theory to have
distinct and real judicial ramifications. Meese, especially, was
unafraid to push the practical legal aspects of the theory. 149 Under
his direction, for example, the DOJ produced research reports devised
15 0
to lobby for conservative changes to the constitutional legal culture.
In his public statements, Meese often struck similar themes, invoking
departmentalism to argue that the President was not bound by the
Supreme Court's constitutional interpretation.t 15 1
For his part, Calabresi has published prolifically on the unitary
executive theory.15 2 Indeed, he has recently published a book that
148See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Unitary

Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the

Harrdan Opinions: A Textualist response to Justice Scalia, 107 CoLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2007);
Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive in Historical Perspective,
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2005, at 5; Steven G. Calabresi, The President:Lightning Rod or
King?, 115 YALE L.J. 2611 (2006).
14 See, e.g., Yoo, Calabresi & Colangelo, supra note 137, at 701 ("Meese explicitly
questioned the constitutionality of independent agencies in a major speech, which was widely
noticed at the time. He also made a speech defending departmentalism-the notion that all three
branches of the federal government are co-equal interpreters of the Constitution-that was
worthy of Thomas Jefferson or Abraham Lincoln. Meese's so-called Tulane speech defending
departrnentalism is every bit as ringing as Abraham Lincoln's similar speech responding to Dred
Scott." (citing, inter alia, Edwin Meese MI,Address Before the Federal Bar Association Annual
Banquet (Sept. 13, 1985), in 32 FED. B. NEWS & J. 406, 406-08 (1985); Edwin Meese 11, The
Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987)))
15O
See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY INSTATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1989); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT T0 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CONSTFITUT[ION IN ITHE YEAR
2000: CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1988), available at

http://islandia.law.yale.edu/acs/conference/mneese-memos/year2000.pdf (discussing the future of
judicial review with regard to specific constitutional issues); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES PROTECTED BY
THE CONSTITUTION (1988) (discussing private property rights).
151
See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, U.S. Attorney General, The Law of the Constitution,
Address at the Tulane University Citizens' Forum on the Bicentennial of the Constitution (Oct.
21, 1986), in 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987) (distinguishing between the constitutional law that
arises out of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence and the Constitution itself, and arguing that
only the latter is truly binding).
52See, e.g., CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 135; Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 135;
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 135; Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary
Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hanmden Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice
Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2007); Steven G. Calabresi, The President, the Supreme
Court, and the Founding Fathers: A Reply to Professor Ackerman, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 469
(2006) (book review); Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive in
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compiles a number of his articles into one source advocating the
authenticity of the unitary executive theory through illustrations of
53
instances of presidential unilateral behavior.'
As initially conceived, the unitary executive theory concerned
itself with recovering from Congress control of executive agenciescontrol first obtained during the New Deal then lost in the wake of
Watergate. 154 Consequently, each President since Reagan has
attempted (with some success) to expand executive control over the
regulatory activities of federal agencies.' 55 However, it was only a
matter of time before the unitary executive theory moved beyond the
purely political arena and insinuated itself into the judicial arena.
John MacKenzie, in his book Absolute Power,'56 describes the first
attempt to introduce the unitary executive theory into a legal
proceeding. In Bowsher v. Synar157 the Court held that the GrammRudman-Hollings Act'58 was an unconstitutional usurpation of
executive power. The Act authorized the Comptroller General to
make fiscal calculations that resulted in budget reductions. Because
the Comptroller General was an agent of the legislature, Congress
could remove him by a process other than impeachment. However,

HistoricalPerspective, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2005, at 5; Christopher S, Yoo, Steven G.
Calabresi & Laurence D. Nee, The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century, 18891945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2004); Steven G. Calabresi, The Unitary Executive During
the Second Half-Century, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 667 (2003); Steven G. Calabresi, Some
Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995); Yoo, Calabresi &
Colangelo, supra note 137.
53
1 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 135.
15Th Honorable Edwin Meese, III, U.S. Attorney General, Towards Increased
Government Accountability, Address Before the Federal Bar Association Annual Banquet
(Sept. 13, 1985), in FED. BAR NEWS & J. 406, 408 (1985) (questioning the constitutionality of
independent agencies by stating that accountability required that "[ilt should be up to the
President to enforce the law, and to be directly answerable to the electorate for his success or
failure in carrying out this responsibility," that "[p]ower granted by Congress should be properly
understood as power granted to the Executive").
155 For a discussion of examples of the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Administrations' use of
the unitary executive theory to advance presidential policy preferences by controlling the
executive branch, see Christopher S. Kelley, Rethinking Presidential Power-The Unitary
Executive and the George W. Bush Presidency 14-20 (Apr. 7-10, 2005) (unpublished
conference paper, prepared for the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association), available at http://www.users.muohio.edL/kelleycs/paper.pdf. For a discussion of
examples identifying Clinton's device for controlling administrative agencies, which she calls
"1presidential administration," and examples of Clinton's public announcement tactics, see Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2283-84 (2001) (discussing,
inter alia, Clinton's 1995 presidential news conference announcing publication of a proposed
rule to prohibit youth smoking and Clinton's 1999 presidential announcement directing the
Secretary of Labor to issue rules allowing States to offer paid leave to new parents).
156
MAcKENZIE, supra note 135.
157478 U.S. 714 (1986).
' 58Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 STAT. 1038 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (1982 & Supp. RII).
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the Court determined that the Comptroller's duties under the law were
executive in nature and that the Act, therefore, was an
unconstitutional exercise of Congressional removal power at the
expense of the executive.
MacKenzie notes that the brief filed by Solicitor General Charles
Fried on behalf of the Reagan administration "cit[ed] [Alexander]
Hamilton's FederalistNo. 70 about the energetic executive, sa[ying],
'The Framers deliberately settled upon a unitary executive in order to
promote a sense of personal responsibility and accountability to the
people in the execution of the laws-and thereby to ensure vigorous
administration of the laws and protection of the liberty, property, and
welfare of the people."' 159 Relying on Hamilton, the Solicitor General
argued that the Constitution "precluded assigning an executive taskthe politically consequential fiscal calculation-to an officer who
16 0
owed his job to another branch."
Although the quote from Hamilton's FederalistNo. 70 marked the
first use of the phrase "unitary executive" in federal court pleadings,
MacKenzie observes that "[tlhe term was not signaled to the general
public." 16 ' Likewise, the phrase was not recorded during oral
argument or written into the Court's opinion. 16 1 Still, it had been
introduced and its origins described in a federal court brief prepared
and submitted by the President's legal team. Given its explosive
potential to cause paradigmatic shifts among the branches of
government, the concept of the unitary executive was bound to
reemerge in lawsuits filed in federal court. And it did.
C. The Unitary Executive Theory Discourse Enters the Federal
Judiciary
The "unitary executive" fully entered the federal judicial discourse
in 1988 in In re Sealed Case.' 63 Writing for the majority in a threejudge panel, Judge Laurence H. Silberman, Circuit Judge for the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, characterized
appellants' general claim as follows: "More broadly, appellants assert
that the [Ethics in Government] Act as a whole jettisons traditional
adherence to constitutional doctrines of separation of powers and a
unitary executive, and in so doing, seriously weakens constitutional
structures that serve to protect individual liberty."'64 Judge
119MACKENZIE,

supra note 135, at 22 (emphasis added).

160Id.
161Id.

F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
'64Id. at 480 (emphasis added).
163838
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Silberman' s use of the phrase marked the first in a federal court
opinion.16

The Supreme Court took up In re Sealed Case on appeal,
ultimately deciding the 6P resented issues in a case that became known
as Morrison v. Olson.'6 Morrison is heralded as the Supreme Court
decision that "demolished the unitary executive as a matter of
constitutional reason." 167 But, as I will show, Morrison did not have
the devastating effect that some believed it did. As the Court
increasingly used the standing doctrine to advance its views on
separation of powers, it simultaneously created space for the unitary
executive theory to reassert itself, albeit in a muted form.
The issue in Morrison was whether the independent counsel
provision of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was
constitutional. 168 Congress passed the Ethics in Government Act in
response to Watergate and other scandals that impaired the legislative
and executive offices in the late 1970s. 16 9 Notably, the Act allowed a
special court to appoint an independent counsel to investigate and
prosecute certain high-ranking officials within the executive branch.
The Act further indicated that the independent counsel could only be
removed for cause.
In a seven to one decision, 170 the Court held that the provisions of
the Act did not "violate the Appointments Clause of the Constitution,
Art. HI, § 2, cl. 2, or the lim-itations of Article 111, nor [did] they
impermissibly interfere with the President's authority under Article II
7
in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers."'1 1
The decision dealt a blow to the "unitarians" in the Reagan
administration who contested any feature of administrative agency
power located anywhere other than in the executive.
However, defeat in this context was not absolute, since so much of
legal development is incremental and occurs as certain phrases,
certain snippets of language, enter the legal vocabulary of the courts
and those who practice within them. Thus, although the decision in
65
1 A WESTLAW Search in the ALLFEDS (all federal cases) database for "..unitary
executive' & da(bef 1988)" (before the date of 1988) found no documents.
1-6487 U.S. 654 (1988).
"1MAcKENziE, supra note 135, at 55; see also Karl Manheim & Allan Ides, The Unitary
Executive, LOS ANGELES LAW., Sept. 2006, at 24, 27, available at http://www.lacba.org/
Files/LALIVoI29No6/2305.pdf (observing that the Morrison decision was "[plerhaps the most
noteworthy" of "[tihe Reagan administration's efforts to apply and enforce its unitary executive
theory [which] met with an almost uniform judicial resistance").

16
8 Morrison, 487

U.S. at 660; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-599 (1982 & Supp. V).

171Morrison, 487

U.S. at 660.

16 9Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824.
70Newly appointed Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
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Morrison was a victory for Congress, it did not signal the death of the
unitary executive theory as a legal argument. From Morrison on, the
concept of the unitary executive would be part of the judicial
discourse.
To better understand the significance of Morrison-how it shaped
the way presidential administrations would frame unitary executive
arguments in future cases, and how it established a judicial threshold
beyond which the Court would not entertain such arguments-one
must delve into the back-story of the case and the text of the opinion.
1. Setting the Stage for a Discussion of the Unitary Executive Theory:
Challenging the Ethics in Government Act in Morrison
Under the Ethics in Government Act, Congress could appoint an
independent counsel to investigate and prosecute claims against
high-ranking members of the federal government. The Special
72
Division, created by the Act, would then adjudicate these claims. 1
The key legal issues in Morrison involved (1) the process by which
the independent counsel was appointed, (2) the particular powers
granted to the independent counsel, and (3) the circumstances under
which the independent counsel could be removed, and by whom.
According to the Act, the appointment process started with the
Attorney General. If the Attorney General received sufficient
information indicating that a person subject to the Act had violated
federal criminal law, Title VI of the Act permitted him to conduct a
preliminary investigation, If, based on his investigation, the Attorney
General determined that there were "reasonable grounds to believe
that further investigation or prosecution [was] warranted," he would
inform the special court established under the Act-known as the
Special Division-and request that it appoint an independent counsel
to complete the investigation and prosecute the subject of the

inquiry.173

Title VI of the Act gave broad powers and autonomy to the office
of the Independent Counsel. Indeed, the counsel had "full power and
independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial
functions and powers of the DOJ, the Attorney General, and any other

72

Special Division was a division of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. It was a three-member panel consisting of three circuit judges or
Justices appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Act
required that one of the judges be from the United States Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia Circuit, and no two of the remaining judges could be named from the same court. 28
U.S.C. § 49 (1982 & Supp. V).
173Id. § 592(c)(1).
1 The
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officer or employee of the Department of Justice."17 4 The counsel's
duties included: conducting investigations and grand jury
proceedings, prosecuting civil and criminal actions against the
persons indicted under the Act, and appealing any adverse decisions
in those actions. Moreover, the counsel's powers included, "initiating
and conducting prosecutions in any court of competent jurisdiction,
framing and signing indictments, filing informations, and handling all
aspects of any case in the name of the United States." 175 Finally, the
counsel could appoint employees, request and receive assistance from
the DOJ, accept referrals from the Attorney General, and dismiss
matters if he or she deemed them unworthy of investigation. 16As
these broad powers indicate, the Independent Counsel functioned as
both an investigator and a prosecutor. Note that under the Act
Congress could remove the Independent Counsel under only two
circumstances: (1) at the Attorney General's request upon a showing
of good cause; or (2) if the office itself was terminated.177 The
President, by contrast, had no ability to remove the Independent
Counsel, even for cause. Congress controlled the entire process.
2. The Facts Giving Rise to Morrison
In 1982, two House Subcommittees issued subpoenas to the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") for documents related to
its enforcement of the Superfund Act.'178 President Reagan, acting on
the advice of the DOJ, directed the EPA administrator to invoke
executive privilege and inform Congress that the EPA would not
surrender the requested documents, asserting that the documents
contained "'enforcement sensitive information.""17 9 In response to the
administrator's refusal to provide the documents, the House voted to
hold him in contempt.180 Although the Administrator and the United
States filed a complaint against the House in response to the contempt
charges, the dispute over the EPA records was resolved in 1983 when
the Reagan administration agreed to grant the House limited access to
8
the documents.'1 '

74

Id. §594(a).
§ 594(a)(9).
1 1d. § 594(c).
MMI. §596(a)(1).
'

75

1 1Id.

76

178Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675).
'79 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 665 (1988).
180Id.
11Id.
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However, the conflict did not end there. One year later, the House
Judiciary Committee opened an investigation to assess the DOJ's role
in withholding the documents.18 2 One of the individuals called to
testify before the House Subcommittee during its investigation was
Theodore Olson.' Olson had been Assistant Attorney General in the
Office of Legal Counsel at the time President Reagan gave the order
to exert executive privilege.184 Olson's testimony came in the middle.
of a tug of war between the DOJ and the House Subcommnittee over
subsequent requests for more documents.185 The DOJ complied with
some requests for documents straight away, while it denied others for
months until eventually capitulating.186 In 1985, the House completed
its investigation and issued a detailed report of its findings.187 In
addition to criticizing the DOJ for its role in the executive privilege
dispute, the report' 8 8 suggested that the Assistant Attorney General
had perjured himself, saying "Olson had given false and misleading
testimony to the Subcommittee . . . and . . . [other administrative
officials] had wrongfully withheld certain documents from the
Committee, thus obstructing the Committee's investigation.",8
The Committee Chairman submitted a copy of the report to the
Attorney General with a request that he invoke Section 592(c) of the
Ethics in Government Act' 9 0 and ask the Special Division to appoint
9
an independent counsel to investigate the allegations against 0150n.' '
In May and June of 1987, the independent counsel (Morrison)
issued grand jury subpoenas for testimony and documents to Olson
and other government officials.19 2 Olson and the others moved to
quash the subpoena asserting, inter alia, that the Act's creation of an
independent counsel was unconstitutional, and that, as a result,
Morrison had no authority to issue the subpoenas.'19 3 In July, the
District Court for the District of Columbia declared the Act
constitutional and held Olson and the others in contempt for failing to

182Id.
8

3Id.
194Id.
85
1 Id.
186

at 666.

d

187Id

188Report on Investigation of the Role of the Department of Justice in the Withholding
of Environmental Protection Agency Documents from Congress in 1982-83, H.R. REP. No.
99-435 (1985).
189 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 666.
19028 U.S.C. § 592(c) (1982 & Supp. V).
191Morrison, 487 U.S. at 666.
2

19

Id. at 668.

193Id.
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comply With the subpoenas. 94 The court then stayed the contempt
orders pending expedited appeal of the matter.'" 5
3. A DialogueAmong the Judiciary
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit split two
to one, with the majority reversing the trial court decision.19 6 The case
was then submitted to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
By a vote of seven to one, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals and reinstated the trial court decision. However, for purposes
of this paper, the lopsided score is less important than the manner in
which the Supreme Court, through the pens of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, engaged in a judicial dialogue with one
another and with Judge Silberman over the "unitary executive."
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that Judge
Silberman considered "several alternative grounds for its conclusion
that the statute was unconstitutional," 19 7 one of which was that all
executive power rested in the executive branch and could not be
appropriated or diluted by an act of Congress-the unitary executive
theory dressed in legal garb. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dismissive
response to Judge Silberman' s finding provided Justice Scalia, the
lone dissenter in Morrison, with a platform from which to launch an
attack against the majority and make a pitch for the unitary executive
theory. 198 It is to Judge Silberman's "alternative grounds"-and
Justice Scalia' s arguments in support of them-that I now turn.
a. The Rhetorical Strategy of the Court of Appeals for the Districtof
Columbia Circuit
The first thing that one notices about the Court of Appeals opinion
in In re Sealed is that it need not have addressed the unitary executive
issue at all. Indeed, Judge Silberman made it clear that the Ethics in
Government Act violated the Appointments Clause of Article II of the
Constitution, thus providing sufficient ground to nullify the statute.
However, apparently Judge Silberman and his fellow judge on the
appellate panel were not content to let the matter end there. They
14nre

Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir.

1988), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
195Morrison, 487 U.S. at 668.
196In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
'91 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 668-69.
l98Yc~o Calabresi & Colangelo, supra note 137, at 729-31. Justice Scalia's dissent in
Morrison has been characterized as one of the most "definitive statements in support of the
unitary executive." Id. at 730.
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wanted to place the issue of the unitary executive squarely in the lap
of the Supreme Court.
The Act's failure to comply with the appointments clause
is sufficient to render it unconstitutional. We decide
appellants' other constitutional claims, however, so that if
this decision is appealed, and the Supreme Court decides that
these additional claims must be reached, it will not have to
"either proceed without the usual benefit of a lower-court
opinion or else delay final disposition by remanding for that
purpose." The appellants claim, and we agree, that even if the
independent counsel were an inferior officer, and so did not
have to be appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, the Act would violate the Constitution
because it impermissibly interferes with the President's
constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." 9 9
With this paragraph, the appellate court effectively opened a
discourse within the judiciary regarding the unitary executive theory,
bringing it out of the political sphere and into the legal one.
Like most adherents to the unitary executive theory, Judge
Silberman begins his comments on the issue by citing FederalistNo.
70, in which Hamilton argues against the idea of a plural exctve.0
Hamilton believed that the populace could more easily monitor and
hold to account one executive than several: "'[It is far more safe
there should be a single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of
the people; and in a word that all multiplication of the executive is
rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.', 2 0' Moreover, Hamilton
argued forcefully that the government of the United States must be
administered by a "vigorous" and "energetic" executive whose
powers are unified within a single man, lest the nation lapse into
chaos along the Roman model. For Hamilton, the "unity" of executive
power is what allowed the President to meet the various difficult
circumstances that might arise.
That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed.
Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally
characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more
199In re Sealed, 838 F.2d at 487 (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1383
(D.D.C. 1986): U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 3) (citations omitted).
2
00THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
201In re Sealed, 838 F.2d at 489 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 479 (Alexander
Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).
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eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number;
and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities
will be diminished. 0
Unity, according to Hamilton, is destroyed by vesting executive
power in more than one person, or by vesting such power in a single
man but subjecting his actions to the control or approval of others
within the government. What gives Hamilton's Federalist No. 70
such persuasive force, apart from its logic and fine prose, is that it
addresses one of the critical flaws of the Articles of Confederation-a
weak and feeble executive. For this reason, Federalist No. 70
functions as a kind of Rosetta Stone for unitary executive theorists,
both in the academy and on the federal bench.
In her dissent, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg exposed the defect
in the majority's attempt to bestow upon the theory of the unitary
executive the same constitutional pedigree as traditional constitutional
20
doctrines, such as separation of powers, 03by channeling the
Federalists. She notes:
The majority places great weight on the concept of a "unitary
executive." In my colleagues' view, encroachment on the
unity of the executive-the singleness of the Presidency-is
synonymous with encroachment on the executive's power "to
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Their
approach suggests that it is a per se constitutional violation to
place any check upon absolute executive branch control of
prosecution. 2
The majority, however, was unmoved by Judge Ginsburg's
critique, and did not soften its position on the unitary executive or
retreat from its reliance on FederalistNo. 70.
Structurally, the majority opinion is of considerable interest. After
indicating that the constitutionality of the Act and the case as a whole
could be decided based on an assessment of the Appointments Clause,
the majority devotes no less than seventeen pages (more so than any
other section dealing with any other issue) to the Act's encroachment
into the executive's power to faithfully execute the law. The strengths
and weaknesses of the majority's arguments on this point, while
interesting, are less compelling than the fact that the majority
2

FEDERALIST No. 70. at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 196 1).
re Sealed, 838 F.2d at 482 ("Central to the government instituted by the Constitution

012THE

203
In

are the doctrines of separation of powers and a unitary executive .
2
04Id. at 524 n. 19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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discussed the unitary executive at all and did so at such length. It is
rare for an appellate decision to spend so much time addressing an
issue that is not central to the holding of the case under review. The
majority's exposition on the unitary executive was not mere dicta; it
was a judicial expression of political theory. And the sheer length of
the discussion demonstrates that, at least for this appellate court, the
unitary executive theory was not simply a debate point for academics,
but a bona fide approach to modem constitutional government-one
that invokes separation of powers principles to create a protective
space within which the President may perform his executive functions
without interference from Congress or the courts.
Judge Silberman, however, did more than structure the majority
opinion to emphasize, perhaps disproportionately, the importance of
the unitary executive; he also took pains to link the phrase "unitary
executive" to "separation of powers" five times, 0 thus suggesting
that both enjoyed a similar constitutional pedigree:
- "[T]he Act as a whole jettisons traditional adherence to
constitutional doctrines of separation of powers and a unitary
executive...,206
* "Central to the government instituted by the Constitution
are the doctrines of separation of powers and a unitary
executive ....2
* "[IIIl of these examples are so at odds with the doctrine of
separation of powers or the President's unitary executive
authority .... ,20
- "The Act further trenches on the concept of a unitary
executive and departs from separation of powers doctrine ...
q1209

~We
"
believe each of these provisions to be a departure from
the related doctrines of separation of powers and of a unitary
executive .... ,21
205

Two uses of the phrase appear in the context of the Federalist discussing the concept of
a unitary versus plural executive. See id. at 488, 490 (majority opinion). Two are conclusory
statements declaring the unitary executive a constitutional doctrine. See id. at 496 n.36, 503.
2
06Id.
2

07Id.
08Id.
2
09Jd.
210
2

at 480.
at 482.
at 495.
at 496.

1d. at 503.
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Judge Silberman' s linkage of a burgeoning partisan political
development (unitary executivism) to the sanctity of separation of
powers is masterful, as it gives the former an immediate patina of
legitimacy. This rhetorical move is one we have seen before. As
discussed in Part HI of this Article, by infusing the polity principle of
separation of powers into the standing doctrine, the Court elevated the
doctrine's importance and, by extension, the Court's power to frame
and decide policy issues. Here, Judge Silberman attempts a similar
strategy. In so doing, he not only engages the dissenting judge on his
own court (then-Judge Ginsburg) in a discussion about the
relationship between separation of powers and the unitary executive,
he ultimately entices the majority and dissent at the Supreme Court to
join the fray.
b. The Attempt to Disassociate Unitary Executive Theory and
Separationof Powers
Judge Silberman faced a formidable adversary in then Judge Ruth
Ginsburg, the third member on the appellate panel in the In re Sealed
case. In her dissent, she not only took aim at the majority's use of
pre-Constitutional authority-Hamilton's FederalistNo. 70-but she
also argued that the majority had improperly conflated the "singleness
of the Presidency" (a descriptive idea) with the political concept of
absolute executive control of the executive branch (a normative
idea) .2 1 '1 Not wishing to grant Judge Silberman's rigid formalist
approach to the issue, Judge Ginsburg provided a functionalist
framework for analyzing separation of powers questions-one
unencumbered by the unitary executive theory that the majority had
foisted on it:
The Court's discrete separation of powers analyses in
Bowsher and Schor should guide our way in this case. Where
one branch appropriates the functions of another the
separation of powers issue arises most pointedly. In these
cases a straightforward, "formalistic" analysis is indeed the
order of the day. But a measure such as the one before us
presents a more subtle problem. The danger of creating an
imbalance among the three branches by taking some business
away from one of them is in all cases a vital concern, but the
actual effects of each apparent limitation should be examined
with care. A more fluid, functional approach is appropriate if
211

1Id.at 524 n. 19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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we are to preserve the full range of structural values
2 12
encompassed under the heading of separation of powers.
Judge Ginsburg's attempt to divorce the unitary executive theory
from separation of powers provided the Supreme Court majority with
the analytical structure it would later use to dispose of Silberman' s
"alternative grounds." Specifically, when Chief Justice Rehnquist
finally addressed the separation of powers issue (he placed it last in
his opinion), he actually adopted the three factors in Ginsburg's
functionalist analysis: (1) "the extent of the removal," (2) "whether
the limitation affects a core executive function, and" (3) "the purposes
of the legislation." 1 Based on these factors, the Court concluded
"that the Act does not violate the separation-of-powers principle by
impermissibly interfering with the functions of the Executive
Branch. 214 However, this rejection of the unitary executive as a
constitutional issue did not end the debate between formalist and
functionalist approaches to separation of powers issues. On the
contrary, Rehnquist' s adoption of Ginsburg's functionalist criteria
only incited Justice Scalia to swing back hard in response.
c. Survival of the Unitary Executive Theory in Substance if Not in
Form
Perhaps more than any other sitting Justice, Justice Scalia has
argued that separation of powers principles place the federal courts on
inferior footing relative to the political branches. This judicial
philosophy creates for the executive branch a significant range of
motion. His dissent in Morrisonbuilds upon these ideas to articulate a
formalist theory of the unitary
2xeutve
Although he uses the
phrase "unitary Executive" only twice, 216 he employs the 21principles of
the theory to frame his separation of powers analysis . ' His main
212
213

Id. at 524 (citation omnitted).

Id. at 525.

214Morrison
215Id.
216

v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988).
at 697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Id. at 727, 732.

217Here,

I provide an exegesis of Justice Scalia's Morrison dissent to examine how
Scalia's use of language created an accepted constitutional argument for the unitary executive
theory within the legal sphere. Other scholars, however, have used the dissent to facilitate
discussions about presidential power in the political sphere. See, e.g., I DISSENT: GREAT
OPPOSING OPINIONS IN LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASES 191-209 (Mark Tushnet ed.,
2008). Professor Tushnet mentions Justice Scalia's partial description and use of the phrase
"unitary Executive" to introduce his commentary on the Bush Administration's pursuit of an
executive-centered "constitutional vision." Id. at 206. Professor Tushnet observes that while the
Administration initially argued inherent authority to exert power, once it was placed in a
weakened political position it could not rely on the "unitary executive theory" alone to
legitimize its actions, and it therefore buttressed its arguments for expanded executive power by
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argument is a basic tenet of the unitary executive theory: "Article HI, §
1, ci. 1, of the Constitution provides: 'The executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States.' As I described at the outset
of this opinion, this does not mean some of the executive power, but
all of the executive power." 1 He casts the executive power in
absolute terms and then presses his main theme by way of repetition.
- "The principle of separation of powers is expressed in our
Constitution in the first section of each of the first three
Articles.. .. And the provision at issue here, Art. 11, § 1, cl. 1,
provides that '[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a
219
President of the United States of America."'

* "It is not for us to determnine, and we have never presumed
to determine, how much of the purely executive powers of
government must be within the full control of the President.
The Constitution prescribes that they all are." 2
* "We should say here that the President's constitutionally
assigned duties include complete control over investigation
and prosecution of violations of the law, and that the
inexorable command of Article HI is clear and definite: the
executive power must be vested in the President of the United
States." 2
Justice Scalia follows Judge Silberman' s lead by citing preConstitution documents to show the Framers' intent to make the
unitary executive an integral part of separation of powers. He begins
with a brief official statement from the drafters of the Massachusetts
State Constitution about separated government and then proceeds to
the Framers: "The Framers of the Federal Constitution similarly
viewed the principle of separation of powers as the absolutely central
guarantee of a just Government. 222 By identifying the concept of
separation of powers with the origins of American constitutional
thought, Scalia gives it a kind of unassailable legitimacy. 2

citing to congressional authorization. Id. at 206-08. Thus, Professor Tushnet suggests that
political rather than legal constraints are what ultimately hinder an administration's pursuit of
unilateral power.
218Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21
1Id. at 697-98 (brackets in original).
220

Id. at 709.

221Id.
222

at 7 10.

Id. at 697.
See, e.g., KENNETrH BURKE, A RHiETORIC OF MOTIVES 21, 55 (University of California

223

20091

2009]
STANDING DOCTRINE, JUDICIAL TECHNIQUE

14
1145

Having orchestrated this critical identification, Scalia then
explicitly argues that a unitary executive is not only allowed under
standard separation of powers doctrine, it is fundamental to that
doctrine and to individual liberty. "The purpose of the separation and
equilibration of powers in general, and of the unitary Executive in
particular, was not merely to assure effective government but to
preserve individual freedom. 224 The rhetorical impress permits only
one conclusion: That the Court, to adhere properly to separation of
powers, must accept that the Constitution calls for a unitary
executive.
As previously discussed, Justice Scalia's opinion did not hold
sway with the majority. This is not surprising given the context of the
case and the particular facts giving rise to Olson's indictment.
However, what is significant is that the dialogue among the judiciary
had placed the theory of the unitary executive within constitutional
adjudication. From that moment on, the theory would be part of the
debate about executive power-not just in the political science
departments at universities, but in the federal courts as well.
Again, however, the facts of Morrison made it less than ideal as a
platform for advancing the unitary executive theory. American legal
culture was not ready to give the President the right to protect from
legal scrutiny agency administrators who withhold documents from
Congress and then lie about it. As Skowronek points out in his study
of presidential leadership, the inherited institutional arrangements of
any political actor-in this case Justice Scalia-will dictate the limits
of any proposed change to the prevailing order. With respect to
Justice Scalia's interest in advancing the unitary executive theory,
Morrison was a poor choice of vehicle. The historical context
(residual post-Watergate distrust of the presidency) and the factual
context of the case itself (a defiant agency administrator) made it
difficult for a majority of the Court to accept his ideas, at least in the
very public forum that is a Supreme Court legal opinion. A better
case, with more sympathetic facts, would have to be found to place
the theory of the unitary executive in softer light. Only in this way
would the majority of the Court, and the public at large, accept it.
Such a case came in 1991, when the Court granted certiorari in an
action involving the geographic scope of the Endangered Species Act

Press 1969) (asserting that rhetorical effectiveness in essence is a function of identification that
produces an "acting together" or "consubstantiality" between author and audience, for, in the
broadest sense, "[ylou persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech,
gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his").
224Morrison,487 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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(ESA): Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.2 2 As shown below, Justice
Scalia's majority opinion in Lujan not only made a convincing
argument for the unitary nature of the executive branch (without ever
using the phrase "unitary executive"), but he also persuaded most of
his fellow Justices that the standing inquiry must take into account
whether the case at bar would operate to destroy that unity. Thus,
Lujan marks the first time the Court used the standing doctrine to
create constitutional space for the unitary executive.
D. The Court Embraces the Unitary Executive Theory Through
Standing to Sue: Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
1. The Facts Giving Rise to Luj an
Lujan involved Section 7(a) of the ESA, which requires federal
agencies to "consult" with the Fish and Wildlife Service whenever
they propose an action that may affect threatened or endangered
species. 2 The purpose of the Section 7(a) consultation requirement is
to ensure that proper precautions are put in place so that the proposed
action will not push the species towards extinction or otherwise
jeopardize its continued viability.
In Lujan, the Defenders of Wildlife and other environmental
organizations challenged the Secretary of the Interior's decision to
amend one of the Section 7 implementing regulations. 2 The original
version extended the consultation requirement to all federal actions,
including those that involved projects in foreign countries. 2
However, the amended version reduced the scope of the consultation
requirement so that it applied only to actions in the United States and
on the high seas; further, federally-funded projects abroad were
exempted . 229 The plaintiffs in Lujan sued the Secretary seeking to
have the old regulation reinstated. 3
The Secretary moved for dismissal on grounds that the plaintiffs
lacked standing and the District Court agreed .23 1 The plaintiffs
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which
reversed on the standing issue and remanded the case back to the
- 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
6 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
See Lujan. 504 U.S. at 557-58.

227

228SeInteragency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of 1973, 43 Fed. Reg. 874 (Jan.
4. 1978)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402).
2
29See 50 C.F.R. § 40)2.01 (1991); Interagency Cooperation-Endangered Species Act of
1973, as Amended, 51 Fed. Reg. 19926 (June 3, 1986) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402).
23 See
231

Id.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559.
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District Court for further proceedings on the merits.2 3 This time the
District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
against the Secretary, holding that the new rule impermissibly
allowed federal actions in foreign countries to go forward without the
required Section 7 consultation. 3 The Secretary appealed to the
Eighth Circuit, which affirmed. 3 The Secretary then sought
235
certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was granted .
23
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven to two reversed. 3 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, determined that the plaintiffs failed to
satisfy (at the very least) the injury in fact and redressability elements
of Article III standing. 23 7 In the course of arguing these points, he
further tightened the relationship between standing and separation of
powers, and he made it clear that neither Congress-through the
adoption of "citizen suit" provisions-nor the courts-through the
exercise of jurisdiction over federal agency decision-making-had the
constitutional right to disturb the unitary nature of the executive
branch.23
As discussed below, Justice Scalia was able to persuade a majority
of the Court of his position in part because the facts of Lujan were so
favorable to the government. Indeed, at least in Justice Scalia's
handling of them, many of the plaintiffs' arguments seem facially
absurd, which put the dissenters at a distinct disadvantage and
allowed Scalia to drive his points home without the kind of resistance
he encountered in Morrison.
2. Separation of Powers and the Unities of the Executive: Justice
Scalia's Majority Opinion
Although Scalia and the Court majority found that the plaintiffs
failed to satisfy both the injury in fact and the redressability
requirements of the standing doctrine, only the first need concern us
here, as it relates specifically to separation of powers and the
"unities" of the executive branch. Therefore, the discussion to follow
only addresses the "injury in fact" portion of the Court's opinion.

232

Id.

23
3 Id.
23

4 Id.

235Lujan
236

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 500 U.S. 915 (199 1).

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.
237Id, at 562.
238
Id, at 577.
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a. Scalia Dispatches Plaintiffs' "Injury in Fact"
Arguments
The plaintiffs had not challenged any particular federal action but
instead had attacked the amended regulation itself. 239 According to
Justice Scalia, this created fatal "injury in fact" problems for the
plaintiffs because, without reference to a particular project and its
impacts on endangered species, the plaintiffs could not establish that
the amended regulation had actually harmed them personally. 4
The plaintiffs tried to overcome this difficulty by making three
arguments: First, they asserted that (1) certain members of the
plaintiff organizations, in the past, had observed endangered species
in foreign countries, (2) these species now are threatened with
extinction by projects funded in part by agencies of the United States
government, and (3) as a result, the members would no longer be able
to observe those species in the future.2 4 Scalia dispatched this
argument quickly on grounds that the harm asserted was speculative
in the extreme; the affidavits provided by the plaintiffs simply
evinced no immediate harm:
[Tihe affiants' profession of an 'inten[t]' to return to the
places they had visited before-where they will presumably,
this time, be deprived of the opportunity to observe animals
of the endangered species-is simply not enough. Such 'some
day' intentions-without any description of concrete plans, or
indeed even any specification of when the some day will bedo not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent'
injury that our cases require. 242
Plaintiffs next tried to establish standing through a series of
"nexus" theories. 4 The first, referred to as the "ecosystem nexus,"
claimed that any person who used any part of a "contiguous
ecosystem"~ adversely affected by a federally-funded activity has
standing, even when the activity takes place a great distance away.2
Scalia noted that such a theory runs counter to the Court's decision in
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,24 5and then went on to draw a
d at 56 1.
401d. at 562 (noting that when a regulation impacts someone else standing is more
difficult to establish because the injury in fact test requires respondent be personally injured).
241 Id. at 563.
242
Id. at 564 (second brackets in original).
43
2- Id. at 565.
2
44Id.
245 497 U.S. 871, 887-89 (1990).
23
2
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distinction between the ESA's stated objectives, on one hand, and the
rights of action the ESA creates, on the other.
To say that the Act protects ecosystems is not to say that the
Act creates (if it were possible) rights of action in persons
who have not been injured in fact, that is, persons who use
portions of an ecosystem not perceptibly affected by the
246
unlawful action in question.
Plaintiffs' other two theories-the "animal nexus" and the
"vocational nexus"-fared no better. According to the former,
anyone with an interest in studying or seeing an endangered animal
anywhere on the globe has standing; according to the latter, anyone

with a professional interest in such animals can bning
Scalia makes quick work of them:

suit.24

Justice

Under these theories, anyone who goes to see Asian elephants
in the Bronx Zoo, and anyone who is a keeper of Asian
elephants in the Bronx Zoo, has standing to sue because
the Director of the Agency for International Development
(AID) did not consult with the Secretary regarding the
AID-funded project in Sri Lanka. This is beyond all reason.
Standing is not a "an ingenious academic exercise in the
conceivable" .......

In making such a poor showing of actual injury, the plaintiffs had
handed Justice Scalia a fact pattern that he could use effectively to
demonstrate why the modem standing criteria must be applied
scrupulously. And by advancing arguments so extreme in scope and
consequence, plaintiffs weakened their case further and made the
often extreme Justice Scalia appear moderate.
b. Scalia Rejects Plaintiffs' Argument that Congress Conferred
Standing Independent of the Article III Requirements
Plaintiffs' third-and potentially most persuasive-argument for
standing was that Congress, through the ESA's "citizen suit"
provision, had conferred upon all persons the right to sue the
Secretary for failing to comply with Section 7's consultation mandate,
even though the alleged failure causes no actual harm to the putative
2
46Lujan, 504 U.S. at 566.
247
248
1Id. (quoting United States

See id.

v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures

(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688, (1973)).
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In other words, Congress had authorized the citizenry to

enforce the ESA's procedural directives. At first blush, this argument
would appear to pose serious problems for the Secretary (and for
Justice Scalia), as the text of the ESA's citizen provision is both clear
and far-reaching in the "oversight" rights it creates. Under this section
of the statute, "any person may commence a civil suit on his own
behalf-(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any
other governmental instrumentality or agency .. . who is alleged to be
250
in violation of any provision of this chapter. "
The Court of Appeals found this language compelling and
determined that it provided an independent basis for granting
standing, the plaintiffs' arguments notwithstanding. 25'I Perhaps
recognizing the appeal and strength of the Court of Appeals' position
on this question, Justice Scalia elected to circle around it before
attacking it head-on with his formalist 'standing is a separation-ofpowers doctrine' argument.
To understand the remarkable nature of this holding [that
Congress conferred standing on plaintiffs by virtue of the
ESA's citizen suit provision] one must be clear about what it
does not rest upon: This is not a case where plaintiffs are
seeking to enforce a procedural requirement the disregard of
which could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs (e.g.,
the procedural requirement for a hearing prior to denial of
their license application, or the procedural requirement for an
environmental impact statement before a federal facility is
constructed next door to them). Nor is it simply a case where
concrete injury has been suffered by many persons, as in
mass fraud or mass tort situations. Nor, finally, is it the
unusual case in which Congress has created a concrete private
interest in the outcome of a suit against a private party for the
Government's benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the
victorious plaintiff. Rather, the court held that the injury-infact requirement had been satisfied by congressional conferral
upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained,
noninstrumental "right" to have the Executive observe the
procedures required by law. We reject this view.2 5

24

9 Id.

at 57 1-72.
216 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006).
251Lujan, 504 U.S. at 57 1-72.
2
25 Id. at 572-73 (footnotes omitted).
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Justice Scalia then turns to the heart of his argument-that
Congress cannot trump the standing requirements of Article III by
allowing "generalized grievances"-without violating the sepaation
of powers and the unities of the executive. 5 He asserts that neither
the legislative nor the judicial branch has the authority to ignore the
concrete injury mandate and become watchdogs over the President
and the agencies that implement his policies. 5 He asks rhetorically
whether the Constitution would permit the public interest to be served
by granting to all persons-either by statute or by 'judicial
declaration-the right to sue federal agencies for violations of the
law.
If the concrete injury requirement has the separation-ofpowers significance we have always said, the answer must be
obvious: To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated
public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law
into an "individual right" vindicable in the courts is to permit
Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief
Executive's most important constitutional duty, to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed." It would enable the
courts, with the permission of Congress, "to assume a
position of authority over the governmental acts of another
and co-equal department," and to become "'virtually
continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of
25 5
Executive action."'

It is interesting to compare the language of this passage with that
of Flast v. Cohen, which granted broad rights to individuals seeking
redress under federal law. Whereas the Warren Court opinion
described federal courts as the protectors of individual liberty against
the abuses of government, Justice Scalia' s opinion in Lujan moved in
the opposite direction, identifying the courts, Congress, and the public
they empower as unnecessary-indeed, unconstitutional-interlopers
who frustrate the executive's efforts to implement the law. For Justice
Scalia, as a proponent of the unitary executive theory, the idea that
Congress could statutorily empower the public to police the activities
of the executive branch was anathema to the structure of the
Constitution and the unified powers of the President. For Justice

253Seid. at
2

4See id.

574.

at 576.
255Id. at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art.

a1,§ 3; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489

(1923); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984)).
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Scalia, that the courts would bless this intrusion into the province of
the executive branch is equally unconscionable.
In the end, Justice Scalia convinced four other Justices that the
plaintiffs lacked standing and that the Eighth Circuit's decision
should be overturned. Justice Kennedy, in a concurrence that also
won the support of Justice Souter, indicated he was persuaded that
Congress could not bypass the injury in fact requirement; however, he
walked lightly through the minefield Justice Scalia had laid out, not
wanting to grant, as a categorical matter, too much space to the
executive branch, as to do so would allow the ever-growing
administrative state to skirt the law with impunity.
As Government programs and policies become more complex
and far reaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation of
new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our
common-law tradition. Modern litigation has progressed far
from the paradigm of Marbury suing Madison to get his
commission, or Ogden seeking an injunction to halt Gibbons'
steamboat operations. In my view, Congress has the power to
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give
rise to a case or controversy where none existed before, and I
do not read the Court's opinion to suggest a contrary view. In
exercising this power, however, Congress must at the very
least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the

injury to the class of persons entitled to bring

suit.25

The references to Marbury' s commission and Gibbons' steamboat
may have been directed at Justice Scalia's oft-trumpeted originalism.
That presumption would allow one to think of the citations as Justice
Kennedy's way of signaling to Justice Scalia, and to the other
Justices, that he believed the modern state has created different kinds
of injuries not known previously, and that the Court should not
prevent Congress from trying to address them. Still, on the facts of
the case before him, Justice Kennedy sided with Justice Scalia on the
ESA's citizen suit provision.
The Court's holding that there is an outer limit to the
power of Congress to confer rights of action is a direct and
necessary consequence of the case and controversy
limitations found in Article III. I agree that it would exceed
those limitations if, at the behest of Congress and in the
absence of any showing of concrete injury, we were to
256

Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public's nonconcreto
interest in the proper administration of the laws.2 5
It is possible that the Warren Court, if it had been given the Lujan
case (or its facts), would have come to the same conclusions reached
in Justice Scalia's majority opinion and Justice Kennedy's
concurrence, but that seems unlikely. It is hard to imagine the Warren
Court chastising Congress for granting citizens the right to sue the
government for violations of the law. Whereas Justice Scalia decried
the creation of "individual rights" to vindicate the public's
"undifferentiated" interest in seeing that the law is followed, the
Warren Court, at least as evidenced by its decision in Flast, would
probably have welcomed this legislative effort to rein in the
metastasizing administrative state. It is also worth noting that, despite
its proclaimed adherence to separation of powers, the Court in Lujan
was going to violate that doctrine no matter what it did. If it affirmed
the Eighth Circuit's decision, it would aid and abet Congress' efforts
to encroach upon the executive branch; and if it overturned the Eighth
Circuit, it would directly invade the congressional province by
refusing to enforce the citizen suit provision of the ESA. That the
Court ultimately chose to protect the executive branch at the expense
of the legislative branch says a great deal.
c. The Role of Lujan in the Rehnquist Court Legacy
When placed in the context of the modern standing doctrine, the
importance of Lujan becomes apparent. It does more than simply
restate that separation of powers concerns form the core of the
standing doctrine; it demands that the standing inquiry be searching
enough to ensure that neither Congress nor the courts puncture the
walls of Article II and damage the "unities" of the executive branch.
While Allen secured the policy intentions of the Court with respect to
the fundamental purpose of the standing doctrine, and Morrison
presumably settled the unitary executive theory question in the
negative, the Court's dramatic implementation of separation of
powers-based limitations on access to federal courts in Lujan affirmed
the former and functionally reversed the latter.
In short, Lujan effectively divested Congress of the authority to
grant standing to citizens to challenge executive branch violations of
federal law, absent independent satisfaction of the three constitutional
requirements of standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.
Given that most federal agency conduct is not directed at individuals,
57

1

Id. at 5 80-8 1.

1154

1154

WESTERN
~CASERESERVE LAW REVIEW

[o.5: 59:4
[Vol.

but is instead meant to implement the policies of the President, it is
difficult to see how Congress could craft citizen suit statutes that
would satisfy Article Ill as the Lujan Court interpreted it. Even if
Congress could draft and adopt such statutes, they would have to
reserve a significant constitutional space for the President to act
largely immune from congressional oversight, public enforcement,
and judicial review.
This is the legacy of the Rehnquist Court, at least with respect to
the modem standing doctrine. While the Constitution may not be able
to absorb the unitary executive theory in its naked, aggressive form (A
la Morrison), it will admit a more politically sensitive version
(Lujan). In all events, however, the Constitution will not tolerate
attempts by the federal courts-whether on their own or at the
instigation of Congress-to disturb the unified powers of the
executive branch. The valve for maintaining the balance between too
much judicial oversight and too little is the standing doctrine. It
governs what cases gain access to the court system and which do not.
But, as we shall see below, operating this valve effectively is
increasingly difficult because the guidebook (i.e., the set of rules
established by legal precedent) is incomplete, chaotic, and often
contradictory. Enter the Roberts Court.
IV. THE ROBERTS COURT ENLISTED THE STANDING DOCTRINE TO
LEGITIMIZE EXECUTIVE-CENTERED CONSTITUTIONALISM
It is perhaps too soon to tell exactly what the Roberts Court will do
with the standing doctrine, but two trends have emerged. First, the
Court has added to, not reduced, the chaos and confusion that has
plagued standing analyses over the last 40 years. Second, the Court
has generally continued the march toward reducing public access to
federal courts, at least when actions of the executive Branch are
challenged. More than ever, the Court emphasizes the separation of
powers component of the standing inquiry, though it invokes
separation of powers concerns far more often to protect the President
than to protect Congress. In short, the space created for the unitary
executive under the Rehnquist Court has expanded in the brief period
that John Roberts has been Chief Justice.
This expansion, however, has been uneven and largely limited to
the domestic realm. Where the Bush administration has pushed the
bounds of traditional constitutionalism on the foreign policy frontnamely, in prosecuting the War on Terror-the Court has been less
accommodating, perhaps in part because the President's actions in
this arena have at times been extremely aggressive and have overtly
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challenged the Court's authority to say what the Constitution requires,
allows, and forbids when the nation is engaged in unconventional
military conflicts. However, at home the unitary executive has
enjoyed increased freedom of movement. The process of replacing
the Warren Court's rights-based constitutionalism with a more
executive-centered version-a process that began in the middle years
of Chief Justice Burger's tenure and was pursued with quiet
persistence by the Rehnquist Court-has been effectively continued
by the conservative Justices who make up the majority of the current
Roberts Court.
No case proves this fact better than Hein v. Freedomfrom Religion
Foundation, Inc., 258 which eviscerates Flast v. Cohen-the seminal
Warren Court case on standing-without officially overturning it.
Although both cases involved taxpayer actions alleging federal
agency violations of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause,
they were decided differently. Whereas the Warren Court granted
plaintiffs standing in Flast, the Roberts Court denied standing in
Hein. Whereas the Flast opinion rejected the role of separation of
powers in the standing inquiry, the Hein opinion identifies separation
of powers as the raison d'6tre of standing. And whereas the Court in
Flast had no trouble holding the Secretary of Education to account for
disbursing federal funds to private religious schools under the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the Court in Hein
was not inclined to do the same with respect to the Director of the
President's Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives and his
use of federal funds to advance religious causes.
Because Hein is nearly a mirror image of Flast, and because it
marks the culmination of the Court's incremental reshaping of the
standing doctrine from a low-threshold inquiry of adverseness to a
powerful separation of powers tool, it will dominate my discussion of
the Roberts Court in this final section. Two additional factors make
Hein a pivotal case for our discussion here. First, it pits Justice
Alito, author of the Court's plurality opinion, against Justice Scalia,
whose stinging concurrence manages to be both logical and extreme
at the same time. Second, the debate in Hein between Justices Alito
and Scalia not only exposes the intellectual weakness of the Court's
standing jurisprudence, it also puts on display the different ways these
two Justices arrive at the same conclusion-Justice Alito, politic and
careful not to upset the institutional arrangements the Court has
inherited and must continue to negotiate, and Justice Scalia, radical

258 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
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and dismissive of false poses to preserve a legal precedent (Flast) that
he believes is wrong and should be overturned.
In this regard, Justices Alito and Scalia represent two different
kinds of oppositional political actors, as defined by Stephen
Skowronek. Whereas Justice Alito maintains that Flast is still good
law and that the Court should simply decline to extend its holding
beyond its facts, Justice Scalia wants to eliminate any pretense of
legitimacy that may still attach to Flast (and, by extension, to the
Warren Court as a whole). Alito works within existing institutional
structures; Justice Scalia wishes to obliterate them.
As discussed below, Justice Scalia's opinion is the more satisfying
of the two-both in terms of its logic and in terms of its candor.
However, it is Justice Alito' s opinion, with its hair-splitting
distinctions and less than rigorous reasoning that carries the day (and
wins the vote of the Chief Justice). Why?
I argue the answer is that Justice Scalia's opinion, while sparkling,
falls outside the accepted (and acceptable) discourse on standing
generally and the Establishment Clause in particular. Justice Alito' s
opinion seems safer; it is more respectful of the Warren era and the
public's still-potent belief that the Warren Court decisions ushered in
a new and continuing jurisprudence based on the protection of
individual rights. Nevertheless, both Justices Alito and Scalia would
allow the executive branch to fund religious activities and enterprises
without judicial oversight; they just arrive at this conclusion by
different approaches. And it is Justice Alito' s approach that is the
more dangerous, if only because it is subtle and painless and therefore
draws less attention. It has the added defect of contributing to the
Court's slide into an Article III jurisprudence that lacks consistently
applicable rules or standards.
A. Flastfor the Twenty-first Century: Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc.
Nearly forty years ago, the Supreme Court held in Flast v.
Cohen2 59 that federal taxpayers had standing to sue the executive
branch (specifically, Wilbur Cohen, the Secretary of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare) for spending funds on religious
schools in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
In 2007, Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. (the
"Foundation"), a non-profit organization, filed suit against the
259 392

U.S. 83 (1968).
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executive branch (specifically, the Director of the White House
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, Jay F. Hein)
challenging the federal agency's use of federal money to fund
conferences to promote the President's "faith-based initiatives." 260
The litigation arose in response to the President's 2001 executive
order creating the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives
(OFCI).26 ' The office's raison d'8tre was to remove "legislative,
regulatory, and other bureaucratic barriers that impedelid]" faith-based
organizations' ability to obtain federal assistance. 262 These
department centers were "created entirely within the executive branch
... by Presidential executive order. 263 In other words, congressional
legislation did not specifically authorize the centers' creation, nor had
264
Congress enacted any law appropriating money for their activities .
Funding for the centers' activities emanated entirely from general
executive branch appropriations. 6
The Foundation challenged the initiative, alleging that it violated
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 6 Specifically, the
Foundation alleged that the department center directors violated the
Establishment Clause by organizing conferences that "'.singled out
[religious organizations] as being particularly worthy of federal
funding . . . "' by suggesting that the organizations' effectiveness in
providing social services was because of the fact that the programs
were faith-based. 6
In particular, they argued that the Flast
exception covered all government expenditures in violation of the
Establishment Clause because distinguishing between money spent
via congressional mandate and money spent via executive discretion

was arbitrary.26 The district court dismissed the Foundation's claims

concluding that they did not have standing. 269 The district court
2

127 S. Ct. at 2559.
Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2002).
Id. at 753. The President expanded the reach ot his policy agenda through concurrent
and subsequent executive orders creating Executive Department Centers for Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives within additional federal agencies and departments, namely, the
Departments of Justice, Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development,
Education, and Agriculture. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,198, 3 C.F.R. 750 (2002); Exec. Order
No. 13,280, 3 C.F.R. 262 (2003); Exec. Order No. 13,342, 3 C.F.R. 180 (2005); Exec. Order
No. 13,397, 71 Fed. Reg. 12,275 (Mar. 9, 2006).
263Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 997 (7th Cir. 2006), rev'd
sub nom.
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
264
Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2560.
60Hein,
261 Exec.
262

265Id

266U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
.")
religion
267
Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2560.
26

8Id.

26

at 2565-70.

at 2561; see Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Towey, No. 04-C-381-S (w.D.
Wis. Nov. 15, 2004).
9Md.
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narrowly read the Flast exception to extend only to ""'exercises of
congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. 1, §
8 i~i The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The court,
under a broader reading of Flast held that "federal taxpayers [had]
standing to challenge Executive Branch programs on Establishment
Clause grounds so long as the activities are 'financed by a
congressional appropriation."' 27 1 The appellate court pragmatically
concluded that "'congressional appropriation"' included direct
funding via statutory programs and legislative appropriations "'for the
general administrative expenses, over which the President and other
272
executive branch officials have a degree of discretionary power."'
273
and the Supreme Court
The Seventh Circuit denied en banc review
took up the issue on certiorani7 and reversed. The Supreme Court
held that, because the department center directors were acting on
behalf of the President and were not charged with administering a
formally mandated congressional program, the challenged activities

did not authorize taxpayer standing under Flast.275 In other words, the
plurality opinion held that Flast "'limited taxpayer standing to
challenges directed "only [at] exercises of congressional power"'
276
under the Taxing and Spending Clause.,
B. Striking the Pose of Minimalism: Justice Alito 's Plurality Opinion
In his plurality opinion (joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justice Kennedy), Justice Alito demonstrates how a Supreme Court
Justice can so limit the holding of a prior case as to render it
meaningless as legal precedent-all the while paying it homage and
appearing restrained. The potentially immovable object in Hein is
Flast v. Cohen, the 1968 opinion authored by then-Chief Justice
Warren, which granted standing to a group of taxpayers challenging
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 on grounds that
the Act-or more accurately, the Secretary's implementation of itviolated the Establishment Clause. 7 Rather than attack Flast headon, or declare it bad law, or seek to overturn it, Justice Alito took a
270 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2561 (quoting Towey, No. 04-C-381-S (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 102 (1968))).
271Id. (quoting Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 997) (7th Cir.
2006)).272
Id. (quoting Chao, 433 F.3d at 994).
273Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 447 F.3d 988 (7th Cir. 2006).
274
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 549 U.S. 1047 (2006).
275
Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2565-66.
276
MI. at 2566 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coil. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church7 and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479 (1982)).
2 7 See supra discussion Part 1.
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softer approach, drawing distinctions (some artful, some forced)
between the facts of P last and those of the case at hand. 278 He
claimed, in fact, to be applying the rules of Flast, not disregarding
them; he simply was not willing, he wrote, to extend Flast to cover
the present case.279 A close review of the text reveals that Justice
Alito' s opinion is at once a marvel of faux judicial restraint and a
logician's nightmare.
His first effort to distinguish Flast centers around the source of
funding that ultimately paid for the acts which the plaintiffs claim
injured them (i.e., federally-sponsored religious enterprises). For
Justice Alito (and for Justices Roberts and Kennedy), the key
differences between the two cases is that the plaintiffs in Flast
challenged a specific statute-the 1965 Education Act-whereas the
plaintiffs in Hein challenged executive branch activities that are
funded through general appropriations provided by Congress to the
President:
In Flast v. Cohen, we recognized a narrow exception to the
general rule against federal taxpayer standing. Under Flast, a
plaintiff asserting an Establishment Clause claim has standing
to challenge a law authorizing the use of federal funds in a
way that allegedly violates the Establishment Clause. In the
present case, Congress did not specifically authorize the use
of federal funds to pay for the conferences or speeches that
the plaintiffs challenged. Instead, the conferences and
speeches were paid for out of general Executive Branch
appropriations. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the
plaintiffs have standing as taxpayers because the conferences
were paid for with money appropriated by Congress.
The question that is presented here is whether this broad
reading of Flast is correct. We hold that it is not. We
therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 8
However, the distinction drawn by Justice Alito proves to be both
misleading and irrelevant. Contrary to Alito' s representations, the
1965 Education Act did not "specifically authorize" the use of federal
funds for programs at religious schools. The Act simply provided
money to the Department of Education to be disbursed to public and
private schools. The Act left it to the discretion of the Secretary to
8
27
Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559.
279
Id. at 2568.
280
Id. at 2559 (citation omitted).
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determine which schools and programs would actually receive
funding. Thus, the central issue in Flast-use of federal funds to
support religious schools-was generated by an executive branch
decision, not congressional action per se. Justice Alito, in a footnote,
tries to skirt this issue by pointing out that in 1965, 78.2 percent of
private elementary and secondary schools in the United States were
affiliated with religious institutions-the implication being that
Congress was well aware of this fact when it passed the 1965
Education Act and therefore tacitly authorized disbursement of
federal funds for religious schools, which was an illegal use of
Congress's taxing and spending power: "Congress surely understood
that much of the aid mandated by the statute would find its way to
religious schools. 28 1 According to Justice Alito, Hein is different
because the general appropriations provided to the executive branch
in the present case were for the day-to-day operations of the President
and his staff, not for specific programs approved by Congress.
But here the facts get in the way. The plaintiffs in Hein were not
targeting the amorphous and multi-tentacled organism that is the
executive branch as a whole, but something very particular: the
President's specially created Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives ("OFCI"), which was established by executive order. For
the OFCI, religious activities were not "incidental" to its larger tasks
and objectives (as incorrectly described by Justice Alito); they were
the very essence of those tasks and objectives. 8 Moreover, Congress
clearly knew that the OFCI would use specific portions of the
executive branch appropriations. As Alito admits, Congress had
informnally "earmarked" funds for this purpose. 8 Still, Justice Alito
insists that the distinction between Flast (congressional action) and
Hein (executive action) is both real, and j urisdictionally dispositive:
The link between congressional action and constitutional
violation that supported taxpayer standing in Flast is missing
here. Respondents do not challenge any specific
congressional action or appropriation; nor do they ask the
Court to invalidate any congressional enactment or
legislatively created program as unconstitutional. That is
because the expenditures at issue here were not made
pursuant to any Act of Congress. Rather, Congress provided
general appropriations to the Executive Branch to fund its
day-to-day activities. These appropriations did not expressly
at 2565 n.3.
See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
283
See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568 n.7; see also H.R. REP. No. 107-342, at 108 (200 1).
281Id.
282
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authorize, direct, or even mention the expenditures of which
[plaintiffs] complain. Those expenditures resulted from
executive discretion, not congressional action.
We have never found taxpayer standing under such
circumstances. 8
"Flast itself distinguished the 'incidental expenditure of tax funds in
the administration of an essentially regulatory statute.',8
Perhaps sensing danger with this line of reasoning, Justice Alito
abruptly changes tack and begins a gentle critique of Flast's failure to
give sufficient weight to the separation of powers implications of the
standing doctrine.
Such a broad reading [of the Flast exception to taxpayer
standing] would ignore the first prong of Flast's standing test,
which requires a "logical link between [taxpayer] status and
the type of legislative enactment attacked."
It would also raise serious separation-of-powers concerns.
As we have recognized, Flast itself gave too little weight to
these concerns. By framing the standing question solely in
terms of whether the dispute would be presented in an
adversary context and in a form traditionally viewed as
capable of judicial resolution, Flast "failed to recognize that
this doctrine has a separation-of-powers component, which
keeps courts within certain traditional bounds vis-a-vis the
other branches, concrete adverseness or not." Respondents'
position, if adopted, would repeat and compound this
mistake.28
However, as Justice Souter points out in his dissent the Court's
concerns regarding separation of powers, if they are to be meaningful,
should exist with respect to both political branches, not just the
executive. And if the Court in Flast, and again here in Hein, sees no
problem momentarily violating the separation of powers to grant
taxpayer standing in lawsuits challenging congressional action, there
is no logical separation of powers reason to object to similar suits
aimed at executive agencies or special offices created by the
President.
2

84Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2566 (footnote omitted).
285
Id. at 2568 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
2
86Id. at 2569-70 (citations omitted).

83, 102 (1968)).
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The plurality points to the separation of powers to explain
its distinction between legislative and executive spending
decisions, but there is no difference on that point of view
between a Judicial Branch review of an executive decision
and a judicial evaluation of a congressional one. We owe
respect to each of the other branches, no more to the former
than to the latter, and no one has suggested that the
Establishment Clause lacks applicability to executive uses of
money. It would surely violate the Establishment Clause for
the Department of Health and Human Services to draw on a
general appropriation to build a chapel for weekly church
services (no less than if a statute required it), and for good
reason: if the Executive could accomplish through the
exercise of discretion exactly what Congress cannot do
through legislation, Establishment Clause protection would
melt away.2 8
That Justice Alito makes this distinction between congressional
acts and executive actions belies a constitutional perspective that
assigns primacy to the executive branch and extends protections to its
officers greater than those extended to Congress. In many respects,
Justice Alito's position (shared by Chief Justice Roberts) evinces a
particularly strong form of unitary executivism, one potentially more
radical than that advanced by Justice Scalia. It not only accepts that
the executive can and should act according to its own lights when
constitutional issues arise, it places executive decision-making on a
plane above congressional action and outside the reach of judicial
review.28 In Justice Alito's view, the executive operates above the
8

at 2586 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Scalia makes this same
point in his concurrence when referring to the Valley Forge case, in which the Court denied
standing to taxpayers who challenged a real estate transaction in which the federal government
purchased property and then transferred title to a religious organization:
2 71d.

Like the dissenters in Valley Forge, I cannot fathom why Article III standing should
turn on whether the government enables a religious organization to obtain real estate
by giving it a check drawn from the general tax revenues or instead by buying the
property itself and then transferring title.
Id. at 2578 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
288Fo literature extolling the practice of executive authority to interpret the Constitution,
see generally Frank H. Easterbrook, PresidentialReview, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 905, 914-15
(1990) (espousing the virtues of executive interpretive judgments); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Th1e
Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221
(1994) (advocating executive branch authority to interpret the Constitution); see also Calabresi
& Prakash, supra note 135, at 594-95 (analyzing the relationship between "executive" officers
and the President); Geoffrey P. Miller, The President's Power of Interpretation:Implications of
a Unifiled Thzeory of Constitutional Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Autumn 1993, at 35
(offering a "unified theory" to analyze presidential power).
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judicial fray; Congress does not. However, Congress can achieve a
modicum of the protection enjoyed by the President by "laundering"
issues-and money-through the executive branch. This is the
inescapable conclusion of Alito' s plurality opinion in Hein.
There is much to admire in Justice Alito's opinion, particularly his
diplomatic and largely successful effort to embrace Flast while
distancing himself from it. Yet it suffers from clear defects of logic
and often creates legal fictions to achieve its objective-two things
that Justice Scalia cannot abide, even when he agrees with the
ultimate result of the case. It is to his concurrence that I now turn.
C. The Immodesty of Legal Reasoning: Justice Scalia 's Concurrence
It is perhaps no coincidence that Alito' s plurality opinion relies
almost entirely on newer, Roberts Court standing cases, such as
DaimlerChrysler Corp v. Cuno, 89 and never mentions or refers to
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. As
someone often described as "Scalito," or "Scalia-Lite," Justice Alito
likely wanted to separate himself from Scalia's influence and thereby
dispel any notion that he is Justice Scalia's protdg6 .290 Despite the
comparisons, Justice Scalia wasted no time going after Justice Alito's
failure of judicial courage. He opens his concurrence as follows:
Today's opinion is, in one significant respect, entirely
consistent with our previous cases addressing taxpayer
standing to raise Establishment Clause challenges to
government expenditures. Unfortunately, the consistency lies
in the creation of utterly meaningless distinctions which
separate the case at hand from the precedents that have come
out differently, but which cannot possibly be (in any sane
world) the reason it comes out differently. If this Court is to
decide cases by rule of law rather than show of hands, we
must surrender to logic and choose sides: Either Flast v.
Cohen should be applied to (at a minimum) all challenges to
the governmental expenditure of general tax revenues in a
manner alleged to violate a constitutional provision
U.S. 332 (2006).
The nicknames surfaced in the media because of a resemblance in judicial philosophy
between the two justices. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Auito Nomination Sets Stage for Ideological
Battle, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2005, at Al ("Alito has drawn comparisons to Scalia, to the point
that some have dubbed him 'Scalito'-as if he were the next generation of the Supreme Court's
most powerful conservative intellect."); Dam-ien Cave, Scalito: What's in a Nickname? A
Melding of the Minds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, at C3; Edward Epstein, Both Sides Prepare
for FightOver Alito, S.F. CHtRON., Nov. 1,2005, at Al.
289 547
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specifically limiting the taxing and spending power, or Flast
should be repudiated. For me, the choice is easy. Flast is
wholly irreconcilable with the Article Ell restrictions on
federal-court jurisdiction that this Court has repeatedly
confirmed are embodied in the doctrine of standing.2 9
Scalia then goes on to explain that the ills of the current taxpayer
standing cases derive from the Court's failure to separate "Wallet
,,292
His basic point is that few, if any,
Injury" from "Psychic Injury.
taxpayer plaintiffs have satisfied, or could ever satisfy, the
"traceability" and "redressability" requirements of standing when
alleging a wallet injury, because the plaintiff's tax obligation to the
government is so small, and the potential judicial remedy so
speculative. 9 Psychic injuries, on the other hand, would meet the
traceability and redressability requirements, but have "nothing to do
with the plaintiffs tax liability," as "the injury consists of the
taxpayer's mental displeasure that money extracted from him is being
spent in an unlawful manner. ,24According to Justice Scalia, the
Court began to run into trouble when it mixed these two different
forms of injury in an attempt to hold government actors to account for
violations of law:
As the following review of our cases demonstrates, we
initially denied taxpayer standing based on Wallet Injury, but
then found standing in some later cases based on the limited
version of Psychic Injury described above. The basic logical
flaw in our cases is thus twofold: We have never explained
why Psychic Injury was insufficient in the cases in which
standing was denied, and we have never explained why
Psychic Injury, however limited, is cognizable under Article
Ill.295

For Justice Scalia, it was Flast that opened the door to taxpayers
claiming psychic injuries-a critical mistake that can only be
corrected through direct and overt repudiation of Flast's holding and
reasoning. 26But this, Justice Scalia argues, is exactly what the Court
has repeatedly failed to do to: "Coherence and candor have fared no

291Hein,
2

92Id.

293Id.
294Id.
295
2

127 S.

Ct. at

at 25 74.

Id. at 2574-75.
at 2576-77.

96Id.

2573-74 (Scalia, JL,concurring) (citation omnitted).
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better in our later taxpayer-standing cases." 9 Justice Scalia goes on
to state: "Of course, in keeping with what was to become the
shameful tradition of our taxpayer-standing cases, the Court's candor
about the inadequacy of Psychic Injury was combined with a notable
silence as to why Flast itself was not doomed. 9 Justice Scalia further
continues:
We must initially decide whether Psychic Injury is consistent
with Article mI. If it is, we should apply Flast to all
challenges to government expenditures in violation of
constitutional provisions that specifically limit the taxing and
spending power; if it is not. we should overturn Flast.

The plurality today avails itself of neither principled
option. Instead, essentially accepting the Solicitor General's
primary submission, it limits Flast to challenges to
expenditures that are "expressly authorized or mandated by
...
specific congressional enactment." It offers no intellectual
justification for this limitation, except that "[i]t is a necessary
concomitant of the doctrine of stare decisis that a precedent is
not always expanded to the limit of its logic." . . . As the
dissent correctly contends and I shall not belabor, Flast is
indistinguishable from this case for purposes of Article III.
Whether the challenged government expenditure is expressly
allocated by a specific congressional enactment has
absolutely no relevance to the Article HII criteria of injury in
fact, traceability, and redressability.
Yet the plurality is also unwilling to acknowledge that the
logic of Flast (its Psychic Injury rationale) is simply wrong,
and for that reason should not be extended to other cases. 299
What seems to bother Justice Scalia most is not that the plurality
actually intends to acknowledge psychic injuries by granting standing
to taxpayers who allege psychic harm, but that the plurality refuses to
be honest about its true position, thus giving false hopes to taxpayers
who bring actions against the federal government. For Justice Scalia,
there is nothing honorable in characterizing a bad case (in this
297

Id. at 2577.
at 2578.

298
Id.
2
99Id.

at 2579-80 (citations omitted) (first ellipses and brackets in original).
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instance, Flast) as binding precedent, but then reducing its impact to
zero by limiting it to its unique factual circumstance.
Why, then, pick a distinguishing fact[, congressional act
versus executive decision,] that may breathe life into Flast in
future cases, preserving the disreputable disarray of our
Establishment Clause standing jurisprudence? Why not hold
that only taxpayers raising Establishment Clause challenges
to expenditures pursuant to the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 have standing? That, I suppose, would
be too obvious a repudiation of Flast, and thus an
3
impediment to the plurality's pose of minimalism. 00
In the lexicon of conservative jurisprudence, this last line is a
serious and wounding charge. False minimalism is no different than
judicial activism, which is anathema to the Court's carefully-fostered
image as the most constrained and least political branch of the United
States government.
D. The Impact of Hein on Rights-Based Constitutionalism
Justice Scalia' s phrase--"pose of minimalism"-describes in three
short words the Court's nearly forty-year effort to repudiate not just
Flast but also the entire rights-based constitutionalism of the Warren
Court. The Burger, Rehnquist, and (now) Roberts Courts have
constructed this "pose" by incrementally adjusting the judiciary's
jurisdictional doctrines while leaving undisturbed most of the
substantive holdings of the Warren Court.
The question is: was this "pose of minimalism" necessary for the
Court to shift from rights-based constitutionalism to an executivecentered constitutionalism? The answer, I believe, is yes, because
without the "pose" the public and the academy would have
recognized immediately that the individual rights protections earned
during Warren's tenure were at risk. The political and public
backlash against the Court would have been sharp and sustained.
However, the "pose of minimalism" has allowed the Court to
continue its efforts to empower the executive branch at the expense of
private enforcement efforts with little fear of inciting public
discontent. Justice Alito, perhaps better than Justice Scalia,
understood the institutional arrangements and constraints that dictate
the Court's public actions; he simply adjusted the text of his opinion
accordingly-i.e., struck the proper pose.
3

00

d. at 2580.
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Of course, the irony is that Justice Scalia is the one who brings this
pose out into the light and subjects it to criticism. After all, it was
Scalia who, in 1983, while still a federal court judge, published the
seminal article calling on the Court to deploy standing as a separation
of powers tool; 30 ' and it was Justice Scalia, first in Morrison and then
more persuasively in Lujan, who convinced a plurality of his fellow
Justices that the standing inquiry could and should be used to preserve
the unitary nature of the executive branch. In these efforts, Justice
Scalia benefited from the pose as much as anyone else, though in
Hein he decided to betray the Court's secret and demand candor.
In this, there is something both admirable and tragic. Admirable in
that Justice Scalia is admonishing the new Court leadership (Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and, by virtue of his "swing" status,
Justice Kennedy) to be more transparent in its legal decision-making.
even at the risk of tarnishing the Court's public image as the protector
of individual rights. Tragic in that Justice Scalia, at least as evidenced
by the way the votes fell in Hein, may have pushed himself to the
margins of the Court's dialogue, appearing too extreme to win the
support of more than one or two Justices.
Ultimately, Justice Alito's plurality opinion in Hein, like Warren's
opinion in Flast, may be constrained to its facts and not applied to
future cases. However, for the moment it is the prevailing law and
provides the President and Congress with a blueprint for
circumventing the Establishment Clause. So long as the funding for
religious activities comes to the executive branch in non-categorical
lump sums, those funds will be beyond the legal reach of any
aggrieved citizen. Thus, the Court has tacitly sanctioned a shadow
government, which (1) operates solely at the direction of the
President, and (2) may pursue potentially unconstitutional objectives
without fear of judicial oversight or intervention.
CONCLUSION
After the Warren Court, the Courts have been oppositional in
nature-seeking to reconstruct the established order along new lines.
The Burger Court came to power opposed to the constitutional regime
established by the Warren Court. As a result, it was primarily
concerned with destroying the last vestiges of the old regime and
articulating the foundations of a new one. However, judicial authority
is maximized through the confluence of the Court's capacity to
disrupt existing legal doctrine and the shaky legitimacy of the status
301See

Scalia, supra note 1.
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quo. The entrenchment of constitutional rights in the American
political consciousness made it impossible for the Burger Court to
destroy immediately the results of the Warren Court's judicial
activism. Its opposition had to be accomplished from within. The
Rehnquist Court can be characterized as an affiliated Court, meaning
that it was primarily concerned with continuing, extending, and more
creatively reconceptualizing the fundamental comm-itments made by
its earlier oppositional leader. The Roberts Court is in a unique
position, at the convergence of multi-layered constitutional and
governmental regimes.
The unitary executive thesis helps us to understand why attaching
a separation of powers analysis to the standing doctrine is
problematic. Moreover, although the balance of this Article has been
concerned with the advancement of conservative constitutionalism
through the conjunction of standing and the unitary executive theory,
the overall exposition of this phenomenon suggests that this same
paradigm of presidential power can be used to advance the principles
of liberal constitutionalism given the appropriate circumstances. The
fact that the reality of American political and legal development over
the last thirty years has been in a decidedly conservative direction
should not obstruct the more important insight that this overall
governmental organization upsets the structure of the balance of
power among the three branches and offends the fundamental
principles of American democracy.
The small number of cases in which the Court denies standing
based on a separation of powers rationale belies the significant
exercise and enhancement of the Court's judicial power. An effect of
the Court's dismissals based on standing is to signal to litigants that
the Court may be willing to revisit the issue in the future and in
another context; placing no areas of law and policy off limits to
judicial action.
The growth of the administrative state and the emergence of a
disproportionately powerful President pose significant juridical
problems. The degree of deference and protection afforded by the
Court to the President will wax and wane as the composition of the
Court changes and as presidents come and go, but the basic structural
deformity will remain, and may become worse, unless the Court takes
steps to reassert itself in the face of presidential power. This
necessarily entails a radical change in the Court's standing doctrine.
Regardless of whether a Justice is politically liberal or conservative,
reflexive use of a separation of powers infused standing doctrine
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poses dangers because it encourages and endorses executive-centered
constitutionalism without judicial review.

